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Date: 1/26/2018

User: TONYA

Sec.udicial District Court - Latah County -

Time: 11 :02 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 3

Case: CR-2017-0000230 Current Judge: John C. Judge
Defendant: Amstad, Daoiel C

State of Idaho vs. Daniel C Amstad
Judge

Date

Code

User

1/31/2017

NEWI

IMPORT

New Case Filed, Citation Import

John C. Judge

PROS

TONYA

Prosecutor assigned Erin E. Tomlin

John C. Judge

ARRN

CHARLOTTE

Arraignment / First Appearance

John C. Judge

. APNG

CHARLOTTE

Appear & Plead Not Guilty

John C. Judge

ORPD

CHARLOTTE

Defendant: Amstad, Daniel C Order Appointing
Public Defender Public defender Latah Co. Pub.
Def. --D. Ray Barker

John C. Judge

CHARLOTTE

Order Appointing Public Defender

John C. Judge

2/15/2017

PLEA

CHARLOTTE

John C. Judge
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (I37-2732(d)
Controlled Substance-Frequenting Place where
Used, Manufactured, Cultivated, Held, Delivered,
Given)

HRSC

CHARLOTTE

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
03/07/2017 03:00 PM)
.

HRSC

CHARLOTTE

Hearing Scheduled (Attention 06/15/2017 05:00 John C. Judge
PM) SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE - Arraigned on
2/15/2017

2/16/2017

RSRD

JAN

Response To Request For Discovery

John C. Judge

2/17/2017

RQDS

TONYA

Request For Discovery

John C. Judge

3/7/2017

CONT

TONYA

Continued (Pretrial Conference 03/28/2017
03:00 PM)

John C. Judge

3/28/2017

MOTN

JAN

MOTION TO DISMISS

John C. Judge

CONT

CHARLOTTE

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 03/28/2017 03:00 PM: Continued

John C. Judge

HRSC

CHARLOTTE

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
04/04/2017 03:00 PM)

John C. Judge

HRSC

JAN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
04/27/2017 03:00 PM)

John C. Judge

HRSC

JAN

Hearing Scheduled (Attention 04/24/2017 05:00 John C. Judge
PM) Motion to dismiss filed, hearing set for
4/27/17

3/30/2017

4/21/2017

4/24/2017

4/25/2017

John C. Judge

JAN

Notice Of Hearing

John C. Judge

HRHD

JAN

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 04/04/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

John C. Judge

SUBR

JAN

Subpoena Returned - CHRISTOPHER HUGHES John C. Judge

SUBR

JAN

Subpoena Returned - NOAH A SHARP

John C. Judge

RSPN

JAN

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

John C. Judge

SUPR

JAN

Supplemental Response To Defendant's Request John C. Judge
For Discovery

ATNH

JAN

John C. Judge
Hearing result for Attention scheduled on
04/24/2017 05:00 PM: Attention Handled Motion
to dismiss filed, hearing set for 4/27 /17

0-0 U:it)!{) {G
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Case: CR-2017-0000230 Current Judge: John C. Judge
Defendant: Amstad, Daniel C

State of Idaho vs. Daniel C Amstad
Judge

Date

Code

User

4/27/2017

DSAT

MYRANDA

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 04/27/2017 03:00 PM: Dismissal At Hearing

John C. Judge

CTMN

MYRANDA

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 04/27/2017 03:00 PM: Court Minutes

John C. Judge

.ATNV

MYRANDA

Hearing result for Attention scheduled on
John C. Judge
06/15/2017 05:00 PM: Attention Vacated
SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE -Arraigned on 2/15/2017

DSAT

MYRANDA

Dismissal At Hearing (I37-2732(d) Controlled
John C. Judge
Substance-Frequenting Place where Used,
Manufactured, Cultivated, Held, Delivered, Given)

FJDE

Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

HRSC

MYRANDA
MYRANDA

ATNH

JAN

John C. Judge
Hearing result for Attention scheduled on
05/11/2017 05:00 PM: Attention Handled Order
granting mtn & dismissing case filed?

ORDR
NSSC
PROS
NAPL
TRAN
·NOTC

JAN
JAN
JAN

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

John C. Judge

Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel

John C. Judge

Prosecutor assigned William W. Thompson Jr.

John C. Judge

BETH

Notice Of Appeal

John C. Judge

TERRY

Transcript of Hearing of Motion to Dismiss

John R. Stegner

TERRY

Notice of Lodging of Transcript

John R. Stegner

HRSC

TERRY

(Attention 06/29/2017 08:00 AM) Transcript is
settled, prepare briefing schedule)

John R. Stegner

6/29/2017

HRSC

TERRY

Hearing Scheduled (Appellate Argument
10/30/2017 09:30 AM)

John R. Stegner

7/6/2017

ORDR

TERRY

Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling
Oral Argument

John R. Stegner

8/7/2017

BREF

TONYA

Appellant's Brief

John R. Stegner

4/28/2017

5/5/2017

5/10/2017
6/8/2017

I

John C. Judge

Hearing Scheduled (Attention 05/11/2017 05:00 John C. Judge
PM) Order granting mtn & dismissing case filed?
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Case: CR-2017-0000230 Current Judge: John c.·Judge
Defendant: Amstad, Daniel C

State of Idaho vs. Daniel C Amstad
Date

Code

User

9/5/2017

BREF

TONYA

Judge
Response to Appellant's Brief

John R. Stegner

Brief
10/30/2017

DCHH

TERRY

Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled John R. Stegner
on 10/30/2017 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 35 pages

CTMN

TERRY

Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled
on 10/30/2017 09:30 AM: Court Minutes

John R. Stegner

12/1/2017

MEMO

PEGGY

Memorandum Opinion on Appeal

John R. Stegner

12/19/2017

HRSC

PEGGY

Hearing Scheduled (Attention 01/10/2018 08:00 John R. Stegner
AM) Terry Odenborg Reminder to prepare
remittitur

1/2/2018

NAPL

TONYA

Notice Of Appeal

John R. Stegneo
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DAHO UNIFORM CITATION

In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has just
and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on:

t

gRo4!osos

·CR044060S-

---l.._ Date/Time:

01/30/201711:04 PM

CA'.<. ~ (;o, I -D c)..::::[J

DR#: 17-M01054

·

M

WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF MOSCOW
\
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND
.__ JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF LATAH,
STATE OF IDAHO,

0

I VIOLATOR

M
N

0 "'O
cu
0 .....
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O' E
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Last Name:
First Name:
Hm. Address:
City:

AMSTAD
Ml: C
DANIEL
DOB:
1001 PARADISE CREEK #813
Hm, Phone: 2084842603
MOSCOW
State: ID
Zip: 83843

Height: 6'3" Weight: 160
DL#:
SS#:

Sex: M

Eyes: BRO Hair: BRO
DL State: ID
Lie, Expires:

Bus,Name:
Bus.Addr,:
Bus,Phone:
Class:

I REGISTRATION
NoVeh:
Yr. Veh:
Make:
Color:
VIN:
IPUC#:

N
1991
HONDA
SIL

State:ID

License Plate: 1A2B515
Model: ACC
Style: 40
USDOT TK Census#:

ILOCATION
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely:
1080 W. SIXTH ST. WALLACE COMPLEX LOT

Accident: N

I VIOLATIONS
Did unlawfully commit the following Offense(s), In violation of State Statute,
Misdemeanor Citation: Y
Hazmat: N
Infraction Citation: N
GVWR 26001+: N
Posted Speed:

16+ Persons: N

Comm, Veh.: N
Observed Speed:

Date/Time: 01/30/2017 11:04 PM
Violation #1: CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE-FREQUENTING PLACE
WHERE USED MANUFACTURED CULTIVATED HELDID~HJ:D GIVEN
Violation #2:
Violation #3:
Violation #4:
Violation #5:
Serial# Addr.:

Dept.:

I COURT INFORMATION
MAGISTRATE COURT
PO BOX8068
MOSCOW, ID 83843
Court Date: 02/15/2017
Court Time: 8:30 AM

I SIGNATURE

Fine#1:
Fine#2:
Fine#3:
Fine#4:
Fine#5:

I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on

$ MUST APPEAR
$
$
$
$

01/30/2017

Signature of Officer: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Officer name: JOE SIEVERDING
Officer ID: 135
Agency Name: CITY OF MOSCOW POLICE DEPARTMENT
Witnessing Officer: 150
Department:

Serial#:

'.> ,~

This Is a MISDEMEANOR charge in which:
Note: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your appearance, another charge
of failure to appear may be filed and a warrant may be issued for your arrest.
1.
You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your expense unless the
judge finds you are indigent.
2.
You are entitled to a trial by Jury if requested by you.
3.
PLEA OF NOT GUilTY: You may plead not guilty to the charge by appearing
before the clerk of the court or the judge, within the time allowed for your
appearance, at which time you will be given a trial date.
4.
PLEA OF GUilTY: You may plead guilty to the charge by going to the clerk of the
court, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which time you will be told if
you can pay a fixed fine or whether it will be necessary for you to appear before
the judge; OR you may have your fine determined by a judge at a time arranged
with the clerk of the court, within the time allowed for your appearance.
5.
If you plead guilty, you may still give an explanation to the judge.
6.
You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can sign a plea of guilty and
pay the fine and costs by mail.

-

I plead guilty to the charges. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Defendant (if authorized by clerk of magistrate court)
IF this is a citation for failure to have insurance:
If you admit the charge or are found to have committed the charge, your driver's
license will be suspended until you pay the fixed penalty, provide proof of
insurance to the Driver's Services Bureau of the Department of Transportation
and pay a reinstatement fee.

* ALWAYS BRING THIS COPY OF THE CITATION TO ALL COURT APPEARANCES*
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Officer Notes:

AMSTAD WAS IN A PARKED VEHICLE GETTING READING TO
USE MARIJUANA FROM A BONG.

-

C:::Y
,:';;~'.'>

~·
0

~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT <::a-iE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I-JD FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
D STATE OF IDAHO,
...,S CITY OF

ABSTRACT OF COURT RECORD AND DOCKET
DISTRICT COURT CASE No.(P-·d:)17-0?EiJ

«:'nSC('")W
Plaintiff
Vs

J

t

A
'9'

.

}::Ye#-,·

~ f er·-AJ:n$ro,ef

·\_

.

I .

p/o [(}

I _ I.C./City Code

\R£

3J- ~ (d .J

Offense
CCJ'l•l-+'Df
hig_{Q
Amended Offensl! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Amended Code _ _ _ _ __

Defendant

D.O.B.
DISPOSmON BY COURT
· ·
Signed by ..\, S,
Complaint Filed. Uniform Citation# c.fl-CJ-11.JD(;,0,5
D State D County i:llity of
('>-"\0.SC.QC-0
D POE D F & G
:::)
Criminal Complaint signed by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ before Judge _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Bail set at $ _ _ _ _ _ _Warrant Issued (
) D Summons Issued (
) Appearance Date _ _ _ _ _ __
Probable cause hearing set for _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Defendant failed to appear as directed in the summons; a verified complaint was filed and the Court issued a warrant of arrest for
defendant. Bail was set at$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. (
)

1(:J..,'-ev-ct.£):v;

D~ndant appeared before Magistrate

~ ~

::::Ji¾-t

.

was informed of his rights and was read the charge.
,)it'appointed to represent defendant D Repay
No Repayment

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D retained by defendant

)I

BAIL OF DEFENDANT:

D Def. Committed bail posted.

Bail set: $ _ _ _ _ _ D Defendant ROR.
D $_ _ _ _ _ ___,,osted D Cash D Surety Bond No. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _D Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D $_ _ _ _ _ _ _exonerated$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _refunded to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
PLEA OF DEFENDANT:
Continued at request of defendant/court until
/
/at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for plea.
,;,;;;. -'-S-D. Appearance made Din wri_!ing D by phone c:ir'in person by ii?ciefendant D _ _ _ _ _ _..,,...._ _ on behalf of defendant
and pied D guilty 8'1ioi: guilty. Pre-trial set for
~~ -:\7
;!;.." t::}r';,, o'clock~ .M.
No contact order issued. Exp.
.Reissued._ _ _ _ . Exp.
'
. Reissued._ _ _ _. Exp.
.
PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL
!)
'",::::J-.c:l
D Pre-Trial continued to
pl 3'.lu at_,_.M. D Pre-Trial continued to _ _ _ _ _ _ __ at
.M.
atL.M. D Pre-Trial continued to _ _ _ _ _ _ __ at
Bil Pre-Trial continued to 4!:-/::0@ '.O(l
.M.
D Pre-Trial continuectto _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ at _ _ .M. D Pre-Trial continued to _ _ _ _ _ _ __ at __ .M.

3-J.16-n

34ff-n

'3

D Pre-Trial: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Dismissed. R e a s o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 Jury Pre-Trial Conference/Motions scheduled for _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ _ _ .M.
D Jury Pre-Trial Conference continued ~-~---...,...,-,.-,-.,.....,~~~-----at _ _ _ _ _ _ .M.
g Motion Hearing scheduled for
)N-d€) )7
at _ _ _ - - - .M.
D Jury Trial continued to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _at
.M.
D Court D Jury Trial scheduled for
at
.M.
D Court D Jury Trial held _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at___ _ _ .M. Defendant found D Guilty D Not Guilty

i-/

JUDGMENT:

@.3 '.m~fi\.-

mD\i(il\-n:Jb.:Sll'li~ ~i:½

q-;:p-

1

Defendant to appear for seotp.pciog/statw;. on
I at _ _ _ _ _ .M continued to _ _ _ __
Court ordered JUDGMENT WITHHELD. Defendant ordered to pay $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ in lieu of fine and costs by_ _ __
which $ _ _ _ _ was suspended on conditions below; Serve _ _ _ days in jail;_ _ _days suspended on conditions below
JUDGMENT was pronounced. Fine:$ _ _ _ _ _ including$ _ _ _costs, Serve _ _ _ _ _ days in jail;$ _ _ _ _ of
fine and _ _ _ days in jail suspended on conditions below.
D Credit given for time already served _ _ _ days.
D Fine and costs paid. Receipt. No. _ _ __
D $, _ _ _ _ _ of bond applied to case _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Paid from Bond.$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ refunded to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Defendant's driver license suspended for
days from _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Defendant's Hunting/Fishing License suspended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D No Court License Suspension.

FINE DUE

CONDmONS OF JUDGMENT OR WITHHELD JUDGMENT:
D Defendant on unsupervised/supervised probation until _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Defendant shall not violate any laws excluding traffic infractions.
D Send a letter to the Court each month that arrives by 5:00 p.m. on the first Monday of each month that is dated and signed and
lists home and work addresses and telephone numbers and case number and states (a) if violated laws; (b) if consumed or
possessed any alcohol; (c) if entered any bars or liquor stores. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

D The defendant shall not consume or possess any alcohol or controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed.
D The defendant shall submit to searches of person, property, residence, vehicle as reasonably requested by probation officer.
D The defendant shall not enter any bars or liquor stores.
D The defendant is subject to testing to ensure compliance.
D The defendant is not released from probation until performance has been reviewed.
D Defendant ordered to pay restitution to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _in the amount of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If completes _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _and provides proof to the Court by
the Court will strike $ _ _ _ __
(DATE COMPLETED _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ STRICKEN)
If shows proof of damages being paid by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ strike $ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date Stricken _ _ _ __
If provides proof of a valid drivers license by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ strike$ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date Stricken _ _ _ __
D Other Conditions or Proceedin ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

·-;'.l

(I

Dated this.~--- day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ 20
Clerk of Court
By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ deputy
PRINTCRAfTPRINTING
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Second Judicial District Court, State of Idaho
In and For the County of Latah
522 S. Adams
Moscow, Idaho 83843
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

vs.
Daniel C Amstad
1001 Paradise Creek #813
Moscow, ID 83843
Defendant.

)

ZD 17 FEB 15 P.M 10: 36

)
)
)
)

sy _ _ _ _ _ DEPUTY

)

)
)
)

Case No: CR-2017-0000230
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER

)

)
)
)

The Court being fully advised as to the application of Daniel C Amstad, _and it appearing to be a proper case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the:
Public Defender's Office
Latah Co. Pub. Def. --D. Ray Barker
P.O. Box 9408

Moscow ID 83843
Public Defender for the County of Latah, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Daniel C Amstad, in all proceedings in the above entitled case.

The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost
of court appointed counsel.

Copies to:

~__public Defender
£Prosecutor
Deputy Clerk

Order Appointing Public Defender

DOC30 10/88

>
Erin E. Tomlin
Prosecuting Attorney
City of Moscow
PO Box 9203
Moscow, ID 83843
Phone:. (208) 883-7003
Fax: (208) 883-7018
ISB #9035

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL blSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
V.
DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
Defendant

TO:

Case No. CR-2017-00230
RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

THE DEFENDANT, DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
and Counsel, D. Ray Barker;
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits the following Response

to Request for Discovery.
The State has complied with such request by providing the following:
1.

Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies

thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known or
is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of
any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer,
prosecuting attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent have been disclosed or otherwise made
available.
2.

Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance of any

relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest in response to
interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the
prosecuting attorney, have been disclosed or otherwise made available.
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3.

Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been disclosed or otherwise made

available.
4.

Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places,

or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense or intended for use by the
prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or belonging to the Defendant have been disclosed
or otherwise made available. In addition officers from the Moscow Police Department and other
law enforcement agencies may record their law enforcement contacts via an audio recorder or
audio/video recorder. Any audio and video recordings related to this matter are available for
review and duplication on request, subject to the provisions of !.C.R. 16(b)(9). Pursuant to said
subsection, and except as otherwise specified herein, any such digital media is unredacted and may
contain protected information, thus further distribution is restricted by I.C.R. 16(b)(9)(A), unless
the State provides express written consent or by the order of the Court.
5.

Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or

experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession,
custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney, the existence of which is known or is available to
the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed or otherwise made
available.
6.

A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of

relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial has been or will be provided
separately in accordance with I.C.R. 16(b)(6). Any record of prior felony convictions of any such
persons which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all statements made by the
prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the
prosecuting attorney's agents or to any official involved in the investigatory process of the case
have been disclosed or otherwise made available. Additionally, the State rriay call as witnesses
anyone otherwise identified or referred to in reports, statements, or other documents referred to in
this response.
7.

Any written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce

pursuant to Rule 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing, have been or
will be disclosed or otherwise made available.

This response does not necessarily include

disclosure of expert witnesses, their opinions, the fact and data for those opinions, or the witness's
RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

qualification, intended only to rebut evidence or theories that have not been disclosed under this
rule prior to trial.
8.

Any reports and memoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney which were

made by any police officer or investigator.in connection with this investigation or prosecution of
this case have been disclosed or otherwise made available.
9.

All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control

which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to
reduce the punishment therefore have been disclosed or otherwise made available. In addition,
with regard to material or information which may be exculpatory as used or interpreted, the State
requests that the defendant inform the State, in writing, of the defense which will be asserted in
this case, so counsel for the State can determine if any additional material or information may be
material to the defense, and thus fulfill its duty under I.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963).
10.

Tue State objects to requests by the Defendant for anything not addressed above on

the grounds that such requests are outside the scope ofl.C.R. 16.
11.

Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or materials have been

disclosed or otherwise made available, such indication should not be construed as confirmation
that such evidence or materials exist, but simply as an indication that if such evidence or materials
exist, they have been disclosed or made available to the Defendant.
12.

Pursuant to I.C.R. 160), if the State subsequently discovers additional evidence or

evidence of additional witnesses, or decides to use additional evidence or witnesses, the State will
promptly notify the defendant and the Court.
DATED this }) day of February, 2017.

Erin E. Tomlin, Prosecuting Attorney

RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

PAGE30F4

-CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Request for
Discovery was:

__

mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid

--~'/hand delivered
__

sent by facsimile, original by mail

to the following:
D. Ray Barker
Attorney for Defendant
Courthouse Mail
Moscow, ID 83843

~
Dated this

I~

day of February, 2017.
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ANDREAS. HUNTER
Attorney at Law
D. Ray Barker Law Office
204 East First Street
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
(208) 882-6749
Idaho State Bar No. 9515

BY ___~
"_,_________ '...J:.:.;~u·:y

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

)
)

Case No.

CR-2017-230

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

)

)
DANIEL C. AMSTAD,

)

)
Defendant.
TO:

)

Moscow City Prosecutor's Office

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Idaho
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of information, evidence and materials as
follows:
a.
That said defendant be permitted, in person and by his attorney, to inspect and copy or
photograph any relevant written or recorded statement made by the defendant or copies thereof
within the possession, custody, or control of the state, the existence of which is known or is
available to the Prosecuting Attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of
any relevant oral statement made by the defendant, whether before or after arrest, to a peace
officer, prosecutor or his agent or other representative of the state.
b.
That said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to be furnished with
a copy of said defendant's prior criminal record, if any, as is now or may become available to the
Prosecuting Attorney.
c.
That the defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to inspect or copy or
photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places, or
copies of portions thereof, which are in the possession or control of the Prosecuting attorney

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 1
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which are material to the preparation of a defense or intended for use by the Prosecuting
Attorney as evidence at trial obtained from or belonging to the said defendant.
d.
That the defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to inspect and copy
or photograph any result or reports of physical, psychological or psychiatric examinations and/or
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the above-entitled case, or copies thereof
within the possession, custody or control of the Prosecuting Attorney, the existence of which is
now known or is available to the Prosecuting Attorney by the exercise of due diligence.
e.
That the said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to have made
available to him a written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of
relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at trial, together with any record of a
prior felony conviction of any such person which is within the knowledge of the Prosecuting
Attorney.
f.
That if, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this request and to
Rule l 6(b) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, and prior to or during trial, the state discovers additional
evidence or the evidence of any additional witness or witnesses and such evidence is or may be
subject to discovery and inspection under such prior order, the Prosecuting Attorney shall
promptly notify the defendant, his attorney, and the court of the existence of additional evidence
and/or the names of such additional witnesses or to allow the court to modify the pervious order
or to allow the defendant to make an appropriate motion for additional discovery or inspection.
g.
That the said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to have made
available to her all statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution
witnesses to the Prosecuting Attorney or his agents or to any official involved in the
investigatory process of this case.
h.
That the said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to have made
available to him all reports and memoranda in the Prosecuting Attorney's possession which were
made by a police officer or investigator in connection with the investigation or prosecution of
this case.
DATED this

j1.__ day of February, 2017.

Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J7_ day of February, 2017, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to, or by
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by
facsimile:
Moscow City Prosecutor's Office
Moscow City Hall
P.O. Box 9203
Moscow, ID 83843
[]
~

[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

By:~~
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IN
THE DISTRIC~OURT OF THE SECOND JUPIC! DISTRICT OF THE
.
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH ·
.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
PLAINTIFF,

))

vs.

CASE NO

·

CR-2O17-OO2-30: NO____ __

ZfJ i 1HAR
- 7 pf.•19 ._j!
. ., 24
.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION

CLERK OF r;0

)

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,

-------------- )

DEFENDANT.

·c, r'\, , _

lATAY(c6u~h\-Cci_i[(;

8'(

----OCPUTY

)

(THE STATE) ( C ~ W ) , AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS:

T""

1. SET THIS CASE ON

~-4'\_ :a:::( ~ \}:

,AT

:~:

w-f M.

.

FOR:

.:£j_p.,

SE_T OR ~ E - T R I A L / COURT ~IAL / SENTENCING /STATUS
_ B . SENTEN~MENDATIONS BELOW**
COURT TRIAL
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD.
_D. JURY TRIAL

_c.

_ 2 . DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW**

_ 3 . AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_

4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**.

1-5. ••oTHER

-ti \ffi.J.

~ b.. .-\\:,

9J l1 '-x\A:n::YJ )'',() u1/]

_ 6 . REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - ...
Y._ES_ _ _ _ ...,.NO-.__ _ _$.__ __

_

7. I UNDERSTAND THE CHARGE AGAINST ME AND THE POTENTIAL PENALTIES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING GUilTY. I UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS AS AN ACCUSED
PERSON AND I VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS. IF I AM NOT REPRESENTED BY AN
ATTORNEY, THEN I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PLEA.
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE. I ALSO WAIVE MY
RIGHT TO ENTER MY GUilTY PLEA ORALLY ON THE RECORD.

x__________
DATED: _ _ _
03_-0_7_-2_0_11_ _ _ _ __

MOTION IS:
_APPROVED
_DENIED
_GUil TY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.)

THE DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUilTY; FINED $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _INCLUDING COSTS.
MOTION HEARING_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
JURY PRE-TRIAL._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
JURY/COURT TRIA_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
SENTENCING._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Revised 12/30/2016

John C; Judge
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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_B. SENTE_ CING; RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW**
_c. COURT TRIAL
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD.
_D. JURYTRIAL
_ 2 . DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW**
_._3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_

4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW** .
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_ 6 . REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - .YE_s_ _ _ _
_

-f-

V\A..Q_;__

...,NO..__ ___.$______

7. I UNDERSTAND THE CHARGE AGAINST ME AND THE POTENTIAL PENALTIES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING GUILTY. I UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS AS AN ACCUSED
PERSON AND I VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS. IF I AM NOT REPRESENTED BY AN
ATTORNEY, THEN I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PLEA.
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE. I ALSO WAIVE MY
RIGHT TO ENTER MY GUilTY PLEA ORALLY ON THE RECORD.

DATED: _ _ _
o3_-2_s_-2_0_17_ _ _ _ __

MOTION IS:
__APPROVED
_DENIED
_GUILTY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.)

THE DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUilTY; FINED $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1.NCLUDING COSTS.
MOTION HEARING _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

John C.. Judge

JURY PRE-TRIAL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
JURY/COURT TRIAL_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
SENTENCING _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Revised 12/30/2016

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

l -

D. RAY BARKER LAW OFFICE
Andrea Hunter
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118
Telephone: (208) 882-6749
Facsimile: (208) 882-7604
Idaho State Bar No. 9515
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
CASE NO. CR-lw o,89
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
MOTION TO DISMISS
vs.
)
)
DANIEL AMST AD,
)
)
Defendant.
)

,1-·:J..W

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Daniel Amstad, and requests an order dismissing the above
captioned case. This motion is based upon the grounds that, even if all the facts alleged by the State
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, those facts do not amount to the offense of "frequenting" as
defined in Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d).

I. FACTS
For the purposes of this motion only, Defendant concedes the following facts. 1 On
January 30, 2017, at about 10:40 p.m., Officer Joe Sieverding approached a stopped H01:1da
Accord in which Daniel Amstad was a passenger. Based on the smell of marijuana, Sieverding
knocked on the window, and the driver, CH, turned over mmijuana and a glass bong. Sieverding

1 Defendant specifically reserves his right to a jury trial and the right to require the State to carry its burden at trial of
establishing the facts outlined above beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in this motion should be taken as an admission
MOTION TO DISMISS
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searched the vehicle and found more marijuana and paraphernalia in the trunk. He cited both
passengers, Amstad and Noah Sharp, for Frequenting, Idaho Code 37-2732(d), a misdemeanor
defined by being present at a place where a person knows illegal drugs are used, manufactured,
cultivated, or held.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
Even if all the facts above are true, Amstad cannot be guilty of "Frequenting" because one
cannot "frequent" a vehicle. Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d) states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any
place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration,
use, or to be given away." (emphasis added)
A vehicle is not a "premises of any place." When in a vehicle, one is not "present at or on
premises of any place." Therefore, criminal liability does not attach under that statute when one is a
passenger in a vehicle in which drugs are present.
Attached is a report from the Boise Community Ombudsman which address this very issue.

(See pages 7-11.) After an in depth discussion regarding Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d) and the language
used therein, the report reaches the conclusion that "the 'premises of any place' does not include a
'mobile domain' such as a motor vehicle or a boat." Id. at 11. Defendant incorporates the analysis
9f the "frequenting" statute contained in the Ombudsman's report into this motion.

Although there is no appellate law addressing this issue in Idaho, Twin Falls County
Magistrate Thomas D. Kershaw, Jr. addressed this specific issue in State v. Traveller, Twin Falls
County Case No. CR-2008-215, and Judge Stephen Clark addressed this issue in State v. Reid,
Bonneville County Case No. CR-2014-3601. Attached is a copy of Judge Kershaw's Memorandum

on the part of Defendant that any of the facts alleged by the State or Officer Sieverding are true.
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Opinion Concerning Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion to Suppress Evidence, and Judge
Clark's Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss. Judge Kershaw and Judge Clark reached the same .
conclusion as the Boise Community Ombudsman. Defendant incorporates Judge Kershaw's and
Judge Clark's analysis and reasoning into this motion.

III. CONCLUSION
The court must grant Amstad's Motion to Dismiss because one cannot "frequent" a vehicle.
One traveling in a vehicle is not "at or on premises of any place." Therefore, Idaho Code § 372732(d) does not apply to the alleged conduct of Defendant and his case must be dismissed.

Dated this

k_1 day of ~h ,2017

An~------Attomey for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11/Jday of tv\.,~
, 2017, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS on the party listed below, by fax and/or
mailing with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand-delivered, as indicated
hereafter.

PARTIES SERVED:

SERVICE TYPE:

Moscow City Prosecutor's Office

~Couiihouse Box
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RILEY DEL TRAVELLER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 2008-215
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CONCERNING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

)
)

This matter came before the court for trial on April 14, 2008.

The defendant, Riley

Traveller, had been accused by a uniform citation of "frequenting a place where drugs are being
stored" in violation of Idaho Code §37-2732(d).
The defendant pied not guilty and requested a trial. Through counsel he filed a Motion
To Suppress Evidence. It was agreed that the matter could be tried to the .court and that the
court would consider the suppression motion based upon the evidence produced at trial.
At the close of the state's evidence the defendant made a Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, Idaho Criminal Rules, and also renewed his motion to suppress
evidence.

MEMORANDUM OPINION CONCERNING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
OF ACQUITTAL AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

-

I.
FACTS

On January 4, 2008 at about 10:00 p.m., Twin Falls Police Officer Justin Hendrickson
was stationed in an alley watching a nearby house. The nature of his activities was described
as a "drug interdiction." Also involved in the operation was Detective Steele.
Officer Hendrickson saw a vehicle pull into the parking lot of a nearby business at a high
rate of speed.

The business was closed.

The lights on the vehicle were then turned off.

Detective Steele approached the vehicle to check on a report concerning fireworks. He asked
for assistance and Officer Hendrickson pulled his patrol vehicle across the street and walked
over to the parked car. He looked into the now unoccupied vehicle and saw in plain view an ·
opened can of beer and a plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance which he believed
to be marijuana.

He smelled the odor of green marijuana in the general area.

He walked

behind a nearby bar looking for the people who had left the vehicle. In a narrow space between
the bar and an adjacent building he saw two people "hunkered down". He believed they were
from the car.

He had so much equipment on that he could not follow them into the narrow

space, but he called to them and they both came. One of these people was the defendant. The
other was an individual named Greenwood.
There was a conversation about the fireworks. Greenwood admitted that he was driving
the vehicle.

Greenwood admitted that he had marijuana in the car. He was arrested for

possession of marijuana and for possession of alcohol by a minor.
After the arrest of Greenwood, the officer had a conversation with Mr. Traveller. It was
raining hard and the defendant stood under an awning to keep dry. He was not under arrest but
both officers were nearby. Officer Hendrickson testified that the defendant was not constantly
watched, but that if he had tried to leave, the officer would have stopped him. The defendant
was asked if he knew his friend had possession of alcohol and marijuana. The defendant
reportedly said that he did know. He was then placed under arrest.
MEMORANDUM OPINION CONCERNING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
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11.
MOTIONS

The defendant's motion to suppress is based primarily upon the failure of the police
officer to inform him of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him about his knowledge of the
drugs.
The defendant's Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal raises two arguments. First, no proof was
presented that the material in the Greenwood car was marijuana.

Second, the statute in

question does not create criminal liability for "frequenting" a motor vehicle, even if there are
drugs known to be in the vehicle.

111.
DISCUSSION

The court will consider the latter issue first. I.C. §37-2732(d) says:
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place
where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration,
use or to be given away.
The defendant argues that the term "premises" in the statute refers to a fixed location,
and therefore criminal liability under this statute cannot arise out of proximity to a movable motor
vehicle. The state argues that the statute also refers to items being held for "transportation" and
therefore being present at a vehicle being used to transport illegal drugs is "frequenting".
The court has consulted several dictionaries and agrees with the defendant that the term
"premises" means lands and the buildings thereon. (See for example: Black's Law Dictionary,
Revised Fourth Edition, p. 1344). However, in reviewing the statute, the court finds that the
more significant term to be defined is "place".

The unlawful act is "to be present at or on

premises of any place ... ". Thus, if a person were present at a place, but not on the premises
of such place, he could still be in violation of this statute. Black's Law Dictionary says that the
word "place" is "a very indefinite term." The dictionary goes on to say that this word "is applied

MEMORANDUM OPINION CONCERNING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
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to any locality, limited by boundaries, however large or however small . . . In its primary and
most general sense [it] means locality, situation, or site, and it is also used to designate an
occupied situation or building." (Revised Fourth Edition, p. 1307.)
A popular non-legal dictionary gives fourteen definitions for "place". Some of these are
irrelevant to the current analysis, but in all relevant respects, the definitions relate to a particular
location, region, building or point in space (See: Webster's New World Dictionary, Pocket Size
Edition, i 975).
The court notes that the terminology in the statute supports the argument that the
legislature intended a particular geographical location when using these terms. It is said to be
unlawful "for any person to be present at or on premises of any place ... ". If the legislature had
meant to include movable motor vehicles, presumably the words "in" or "near" would have been
used. One is at a house or on land. One is in or near a car.
Regarding the state's argument about the term "transportation," the statute says that one
has to be "present at or on premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances
are being ... held for ... transportation ... ". It is therefore not the transportation which is
illegal but the act of being present at a place where drugs are being held for transportation.
As the defendant points out, the statute is at the very least ambiguous as. applied to
people who are in proximity to illegal drugs in motor vehicles. Ambiguous criminal statues must
be strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Martinez, i 26 Idaho 801, 891 P.2d 1061
(App. 1995).
For this reason, the court finds the statute inapplicable to this defendant's actions as
described in the evidence, and therefore grants his motion for acquittal. The court finds that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for "frequenting".

The court notes as an

additional basis for this decision that other than the officer's visual inspection, no evidence was
presented at the trial that the substance found in the Greenwood vehicle was an "illegal
controlled substance".
MEMORANDUM OPINION CONCERNING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
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It is unnecessary to rule_ on the Motion To Suppress Evidence.
It is therefore ORDERED that this case is dismissed.
DATED this

..2_ day of May, 2008.

s_(}v_\AG,~
Thomas D. Kershaw, Jr.
Magistrate Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

B

I hereby certify that on the
day of May, 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

( ) U.S. Mail

Fritz Wonderlich
City Attorney
PO Box 1812
Twin Falls ID 83301
Anthony Valdez
Attorney at Law
PO Box 366
Twin Falls ID 83301

( ) Hand delivered
( ) Faxed
,J--YCourt Folder

( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand delivered
( ) Faxed
,

~)'Court Folder

l
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

.
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNE.Vil ,l,R .
MAGISTRATE DIVISION

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
COURTNEY J. REID,
Defendant,

·.

.

.

. D'L., TI{ 1CT COURT
HA G/STR ATf DfVISIOf
BONNH'lltE COUNT'l/

lDAHO

Case No. CR- 2014-3601

COURT'S ORDER
ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter came on for hearing on July 23, 2014 on the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The
State was represented by Mr. Crowiher and the Defense by Mr. Crane. The motion was
predicated on the inapplicability of the term "premises" to a vehicle. Mr. Crane provided a
rather extensive review of the statute from an ombudsman's report from 2006. He also appended
to his motion an unpublished opinion from Twin Falls in support of his position. In that opinion

the magistrate focused his attention on the term "place". Mr. Crowther argues that the definition
of"premises" as argued by Mr. Crane was much too narrow. Not surprisingly, Mr. Crane argued
that Mr. Crowther's response was much too broad as there would be virtually no limit as to what
would constitute a "premises''.
The Defendant conceded the facts as adopted by the state as being true for the purpose of his
motion. That is, the defense conceded: that jurisdiction was proper; identification was not
disputed; that there were controlled substances in the vehicle and that
were control1ed substances in the vehicle in which she was traveling.
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As the defense has agreed that the facts are to be construed in favor of the state the Court will
proceed accordingly. The Court views the issue as being made up of three parts. The parties
focused their arguments on whether a vehicle constituted a "premises." The Court has reviewed
the documents provided by the defendant and considered the arguments of counsel. Neither the
ombudsman's report nor the Twin Falls case submitted in this matter by Mr. Crane is binding
upon the Court. However, the court appreciates the reasoning employed by both sources. The
discussion focusses around the statutory language, to-wit: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
be present at or on the premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are

being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery,
administration, use, or be given away. " (Emphasis added)
The legislative history indicates that the legislature has tried to cast as broad a net as possible in
adopting this statute. Idaho Session Laws 1972, ch. 133, Section 6 p. 261 struck the language
from the original statute which required a person to "knowingly frequent" such places to require
that "he knows." The more expansive amendment followed in 1977 with Senate Bill 1109
substituting "be present at or on the premises" for "frequenting". The net effect was to eliminate
the requirement of repeated conduct and to expose an individual to criminal charges for a single
act The general reference to this charge as "frequenting" is actually a misnomer, because with
the changes a single action v>1ould now constitute a violation. The current iteration now suffers
from the amendments as the attempt to broaden the·statute without completely rewriting it or
integrating the changes provides the opportunity to make the arguments presented in this case.
The term "premises" is used repeatedly through the Idaho Code. In most situations, when it is
used in the statutes it is used conventionally. That is, the term generally references a specific
location and usually land. Several statues attempt to define, "premises". Idaho code Sections;

Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss-Page 2
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23-902, 48-703, and 48-602 all have definitions of "premises." In each case the definition seems
to use the term as defining a set point rather than a mobile method of transportation. Where it is
defined, it is never used to describe a car. At least one case did talk about the term in the context
, of construing a contract, Haines v. Continental Insurance. Co. 852 F. 2d 1289 (1988.) In that
case the court interpreted the term "premises'' as having to do with land. It would take a
tortured reading of "premises" to expand it to include a car. A mobile home or trailer may be an
exception to this definition.
That does not end the discussion as the Court in Twin Falls focused on the term "place" rather
than "premises". This constitutes the second issue involving this statute. The language references
at or on the premises of any place. It is informative to note that it does not say premises or any
place, but rather the premises of any place. If the disjunctive was used then the, court could find
that although mobile, a car is a place. Given the language used the term "place" appears to be
modified by the word ''premises." The court is not free to insert terms into statutes when there
is no ambiguity, Roe v. Hopper, 90 Idaho 22, 408 P .2d 1161 (1965) (Court construing the term
"place,") There is one statutory definition of "place". Idaho code section 23-942 does define the
term "place" where the sale of alcoholic beverages occurs. In that context it talks about any
room of any premises. Once again we circle back around to a fixed physical location. "Place" is
discussed in Sun Valley v. Sinclair, 123 Idaho 665, 851 P.2d 961 (1993) in regard to taxing
issues. However, the decision does not assist the court in interpreting the statute at issue.
Intermountain Health Care v. Blaine County, 109 Idaho 412, 707 P.2d 1051 (1985) discusses
"place of domicile" for indigency purposes, but it again adds little. Lastly, Voyles v. City of
Nampa, 97 Idaho 597, 548 P. 2d 1217 (1976) talks about a "public place", but again provides no
benefit in solving this conundrum.
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The third and final issue deals with what knowledge is necessary. To date the general
understanding was that if the defendant had knowledge that a controlled substance was present;
that was sufficient. Under most circumstances the burden is too easily met. (ln thinking back
over my years at Berkeley, its 30,000 plus student population would have provided substantial
fodder for this statue if simple knowledge that someone possessed marijuana created criminal
liability for frequenting.) However, the statute requires more than knowledge that controlled
substances are present, "where he knows". The statute further requires knowledge that the
controlled substances are present for: manufacture, cultivation, use, distribution, transportation,
or being freely given away. To construe the statute to require only knowledge that the substance
was present would virtually criminalize knowledge and open the door to a panoply of concerns.
ls walking past a house where you know a controlled substance might be present sufficient to
bring the statute into play? It would further potentially punish people who perhaps never had any
intention to use or even touch the controlled substance. Circumstantially, once an individual is
in a car, it would be hard to argue 1?-at the controlled substance was not being transported. There
have been no challenges to the statute itself as being overly broad in either its application or in
general.
CONCLUSION
Both documents provided by the defense recognize that the concept of lenity requires the court
to strictly construe criminal statutes against the state, State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 891 P. 2d
1061, (Ct of App 1995). There is no question that this is a crin1inal statute. As the court was
considering this issue, it was put in mind of President Clinton's defense of, "it depends on what
the definition of "is" is. Only in this profession would someone spend 4 pages dealing with the
etymology and arcane definition of "premises" and "place". Be that as it may, the Court
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concludes that a vehicle is neither a "premises" nor a "premises of any place". As a result the
defendant cannot be "at" or "on" a "premises" or "premises of any place". Whether the
defendant had knowledge that the controlled substances were being used, distributed,
transported, or etc. is a jury question and would not provide a basis for dismissal.

Based upon the above the motion to suppress is GRANTED. The Court would encourage either
party offended by this opinion to appeal the matter so that those more ,vise and learned can
address the issue.

DATED this ¼17.ay
of July~ 2014.
.
~
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OMBUDSMAN'S REPORT
Complaint Investigation & Findings
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THE SITUATION

The Complainants in this case are Witness #1 's parents.

On September 7, 2005, two

juveniles, Witness #1 and Witness #2, both students at School #1, left campus in Witness
#2's car to have lunch. Witness #2 parked his car in a private parking lot of a business.
Witness #3, an employee of the business, went to investigate and saw a bag of marijuana
sitting on the seat. She contacted Officer # 1 to report the possible controlled substance
violation. While she and another employee waited for the police to arrive, they moved a
different car in back of Witness #2's car to block it from exiting the parking space.

Officer #2 and Officer #3 were the first to arrive on the scene, followed by Officer #4. After
brief questioning, Witness #2 admitted that the marijuana belonged to him and gave it to the
officers. Officer # I arrived a short time later and charged Witness #2 with the possession of
marijuana. He also charged Witness # I with the misdemeanor commonly referred to as
"frequenting" for having knowingly been in the company of someone who was in possession
of a controlled substance. After the boys left the scene, Officer # 1, who still had his audio
recorder on, questioned whether the frequenting charges applied, laughed, and described
Witness #1 as a "lying little asshole."

At the request of the State, a magistrate later

dismissed the misdemeanor frequenting charge against Witness #1.

THE COMPLAINT

The Complainants are the parents of Witness #1. On September 7, 2005, Witness #1 and
Witness #2 parked, without permission, in a private parking lot of a downtown business.
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Witness #3, an employee of the business, saw a baggie of marijuana on the seat of the car.
She contacted the police; and four Boise Police officers detained Witness #1 and Witness #2.
Witness #2 admitted that the marijuana belonged to him. Officer #1 charged Witness #2
with the possession of marijuana, and accused Witness #1 of having smoked marijuana with
his friend. The Complainants state that Officer #1 spoke to Witness #1 in a belittling and
unprofessional manner. They also state that Officer # 1 filed a questionable "frequenting"
charge against Witness #1.

They feel that the charges were filed against Witness #1 in

retaliation against him for having been, in the officer's words, a "little lying asshole" when
he denied that he had used drugs. The Complainants filed a complaint with this office by
hand-delivering a letter on February 28, 2006. The Complainants' allegations, if proven true,
would be violations of the Boise Police Department's Policy § 11.03.02 Perfonnance of
Duty, § 11.01.07 Relationships with Others and Demeanor, and

§ 11.03.04 General

Discharge of Duties.

THE COMPLAINT INVEST/GA TION

The investigation into this complaint included a review of the dispatch records.

It also

included a review of the documents provided by the Complainants, including a transcript of
Officer #1 's audio recordings, Officer #1 's report, the Petition charging Witness #1 with
Frequenting, the Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum filed by the attorney for
Witness # 1, the Motion to Dismiss field by the State, the Order to Dismiss signed by the
court, a hand-drawn diagram by Officer #4, and an unsigned, undated letter from Witness #3.
Four digital audio recordings made by officers during the incident were reviewed and
analyzed for relevant evidence. Interviews of Officer #1, Officer #2, Officer #4, and Witness
#1 were also conducted; and a conversation was held with an attorney in the prosecutorial
agency that prosecuted, and ultimately dismissed, the frequenting charge.
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WHAT THE COMPLAINT TNVEST1GATION FOUND

Based on the preponderance of the evidence obtained and reviewed in the course of this
investigation, I issued the following findings of fact.

1.

Witness #1 and Witness #2 left School #1 to have lunch.

2.

Witness #2 parked his car in the private parking lot of a business near the
restaurant where Witness #1 and Witness #2 went to eat.

3.

Witness #3 noted that the car did not belong in her employer's parking lot and
went to investigate.

4.

Witness #3 found a baggie of marijuana in plain view on the front seat of Witness
#2 's car and contacted the police.

5.

Witness #3 and a co-worker blocked Witness #2's car from leaving the parking
space.

6.

While Witness #3 was waiting for the police to aITive, Witness# 1 and Witness #2
returned from having lunch.

7.

With Witness #3 still blocking the parking place in order to prevent Witness # 1
and Witness #2 from leaving, Witness #1 opened the car door and removed the
baggie of marijuana from the front seat, then walked toward a nearby dumpster
and threw something in, which later turned out to be paper plates and pizza crusts.

8.

Officer #2, Officer #3, and Officer #4 arrived at the scene and began conducting
preliminary questioning of Witness# l and Witness #2.

9.

Witness #2 admitted he had marijuana and turned it over to Officer #2.

10.

Witness #1 did not know that Witness #2 had marijuana in the car until they were
already en route to the restaurant.

11.

Officer # l administered field sobriety tests to Witness # 1 and concluded that
Witness #1 was not under the influence of marijuana; however Officer #1 decided
to charge Witness #1 with the misdemeanor frequenting a place where drugs were
being held for use.

12.

Officer #1 did not arrest Witness #1 and Witness #2 and allowed them to return to
School# 1.
P"i'- 3
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13.

After Witness # 1 and Witness #2 had left, Officer # 1 began discussing the matter
with one of the other officers.

14.

During the conversation, Officer # 1 said that he thought the frequenting charges
applied to Witness #1 and referred to Witness #1 as "a little lying asshole."

15.

Officer #1 realized that his audio recorder was still on, laughed, and said that
what he meant to say was that if Witness # l was not being honest, he "should
probably ... " The tape then ends.

16.

The State filed a Petition on December 19, 2005, charging Witness #1 with
Frequenting, a misdemeanor, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d).

17.

Witness #1 filed a Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a supporting
memorandum, on February 2, 2006.

18.

The State also filed a Motion to Dismiss sometime in February 2006.

19.

The State's Motion to Dismiss was based on the fact that Witness #1 claimed, and
the State could not disprove, that he had no knowledge that the marijuana was
present in the car at the time he got into the car.

20.

The presiding magistrate granted one of the pa11ies' motions and entered an Order
to Dismiss.

OMBUDSMAN'S ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
I. Performance of Duty.
A. The Frequenting Statute.

The Complainants' first claim is that Officer# 1 pursued a questionable charge of frequenting
against Witness #1. The Boise Police Department's policy(§ 11.03.02) Performance of Duty
states, in relevant paii:

P~I./

000041

OH1W6!002~
o.,../,~'4 R~ - C ~ ~ A N l f ~
~30, 2006

An employee shall perform his/her duties in a manner which will maintain the
highest standards of efficiency in carrying out the Department's.functions and
objectives. Satisfactory pe1formance and competence is demonstrated by:
• Adequate knowledge of the application o,f laws required to be enforced
In this case, Officer #1 charged Witness #1 with the misdemeanor of frequenting as
defined in Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d):
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place
where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transpo1iation, delivery,
administration, use, or to be given away. A violation of this section shall
deem those persons guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars ($300) and not more
than ninety (90) days in the county jail, or both.
Idaho Code § 37-2732(d).

The Complainants raise the question whether a charge of

frequenting can be made against someone who is merely in the presence of a second person
who is unlawfully in the possession of a controlled substance. In interviewing the officers
involved, it became clear that there are key provisions of the statute that appear to be
construed differently within the police department itself. Additional research indicates that
law enforcement's interpretation of the statue may be inconsistent with the plain meaning of
the statue.

B. The Statutory History.

Idaho Code§ 37-2732 was originally enacted in 1971. IDAHO SESSION LAWS 1971, ch. 215,
§ 1 p. 939. The original statute included only subsections (a) through (c); it did not include
subsection (d). The statute was amended in 1972 to add subsection (d); the original language
of this subsection was:
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly frequent places where illegal
controlled substances are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery,
administration, use, or to be given away. A violation of this subsection shall deem
those persons guilty of a petty misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished
by a fine of not more that five hundred dollars ($500) and not more than thi1iy (30)
days in the county jail, or both.
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IDAHO SESSION LA ws 1972, ch. 133, § 6 p. 261. Subsection (d) was amended that same year
to delete the word, "knowingly," and substitute the phrase, "he knows," after the word
"frequent." IDAHO SESSION LAWS 1972, ch. 409, § 1 p. 1195.
In 1977, the legislature modified subsection (d) to include the language present in the statute
today.

Senate Bill 1109 was introduced on February 2, 1977, and added subsection (f),

which addressed a situation in which two or more persons conspired to commit any offense
under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

As noted in the minutes of the Senate

Judiciary and Rules Committee, the purpose of the bill was to add the crime of conspiracy to
sell drugs under the state's adoption of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act:
RS 1968 Controlled Substances, Consgiracy -· prescribes offenses and penalties for
conspiracy under the act. Senator Risch stated that this legislation provides for
additional crime and penalty under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act applicable
to those who conspire to sell or transport controlled substances.
Minutes of the Judiciary and Rules Committee, February 2, 1977, p. l. The Statement of
Purpose for R.S. 1968, which was subsequently designated as Senate Bill 1109, explained:
This bill is an attempt to immobilize the top echelon financiers of drug
trafficking by prescribing offenses and penalties for conspiracy under the Uniform
Controlled Substance Act.
This bill is submitted at the request of the Idaho Department of Law
Enforcement.
Statements of Purpose (1977), R.S. 1698, S.B. 1109.
While the Senate introduced a bill to create the crime of conspiracy under the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the house introduced a separate bill, R.S. 1821, later
designated House Bill 152, which amended the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in three
respects. Its first proposed change, the one that is applicable to the present discussion, was to
change the word, "frequenting," to the phrase "be present at or on the premises."

The

purpose of the change was to make the charge easier to prove; the minutes of the House
Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee state:
Mr. Hosack spoke in support of this bill [R.S. 1821, later designated House Bill 152],
indicating that it was necessary to clear up some conflicts in the bill among other
things. It would change the wording from "frequenting" a place where there is
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marijuana to "be at or present". (sic). It is very difficult to prove "frequenting" but
relatively easy to prove "at or present". (sic).
Minutes of the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee, February 9, 1977, p.
1. The purpose of the proposed change was to make the 1aw easier to enforce, Proving that
someone is present a single time at a location is easier to prove than proving that someone is
repeatedly or habitually present at a location. Lowering the threshold of activity that would
result in criminal liability was clearly the object of the amendment. The changes House Bill
152 proposed eventually became the House Amendments to Senate Bill 1109, including the
deletion of the word, "frequenting," and the insertion of the phrase, "be at or on the premises
of any place." Senate Bill 1109, as amended by the House, was approved on March 30,
1977, and subsequently became law.

C. The Interpretation of the Term, "Premises of any Place."
The first question is what the term, "premises of any place," means as used in Idaho Code §
37-2732(d).

The officers interpret the statute broadly, focusing on the object of the

preposition, "any place." Officer# 1, Officer #2, and Officer #3 all stated that a premises can
be any place, including places open to the public, such as parks, as long as the person
charged is in the company of a person who is in the possession of drugs, and that person
knows that his or her companion has drngs. This interpretation implies that it is not only
illegal to frequent a "place," it is illegal to frequent a "person."

Under this expansive interpretation, the concept of the "premises of any place" where drugs
are known to be used or sold becomes peripatetic. Any location, including a street comer, a
car, a parking lot, a restaurant, a public park, or any other place that a person has a legal right
to be, has the potential to become an illegal venue, regardless of whether drugs are
customarily known to be sold or used there or not. The place is a legal place to be, or not,
depending on who is there.

The only factor that determines the legality of a person's

presence in that location is whether someone else in that location is in the possession of
drugs and the person charged was aware of it.
P"i" 7
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A hypothetical example can help to illustrate the type of problem that can arise. If person
"A" were attending a concert at a public concert house, and persons sitting near "A" began
smoking marijuana cigarettes, under the interpretation put forward by the officer, "A" could
be charged with frequenting. "A" probably paid for a ticket to enter the concert venue and
would be disinclined to leave the concert simply because people in the vicinity were smoking
marijuana. "A" may also find the marijuana smoke objectionable and disapprove of the
activity. Nonetheless, under the interpretation put forth by the officers, "A" has a duty to
leave the premises or risk being charged with frequenting. Under that interpretation, "A"
does not have the right to remain in a place open to the public, even if "A" paid for the
privilege of being there.
The above interpretation differs somewhat from the interpretation of Officer #5, who
accompanied Officer # l to the interview.

Officer #5 conducts officer training; and he

addresses the issue of frequenting in his training. Officer #5 has a more limited view of the
meaning of "premises:" he explained that a person in a public venue, such as a park, would
not be charged with frequenting. On the other hand, because a vehicle is a part of a person's
domain, it is appropriate to charge someone with frequenting if the premises where the drugs
are located is a vehicle.

In support of this interpretation, Officer #3 explained that many mobile methamphetamine
labs are located in motor vehicles. The narcotics unit often uses the frequenting statute to
charge persons who are in the vicinity of a vehicle where methamphetamine is being
manufactured, even if those persons cannot be clearly tied to the manufacturing operation.
Even though there is some variance between the officers' interpretation of the statue with
respect to the question whether Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) applies to a public venue, there is
no divergence in the interpretation of the statue when it comes to the question whether a
"place" includes a vehicle. Clearly, according to the officers, a "place," for the purpose of
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d), includes a vehicle.

-
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The question whether the term, "premises," includes a person's vehicle was answered
differently by the attorney who represented Witness #1. In his Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, the attorney argued that, in the applicable statute, Idaho Code § 372732(d), the term, "premises," does not include a vehicle:
In fact, the terms "premises" and "vehicle" are separate and distinct concepts. This
point is evident throughout the Idaho Code where both of these terms are used
frequently, but not interchangeably, Compare I.C. § 23-l00l(g) (d.efining "premises"
to include "the building and contiguous property" but not a motor vehicle.); and I.C.
§ 49-l 23(g) ( defining "motor vehicle" to include "self-propelled" vehicles, but
making no mention of premises, buildings or the like).
Had the legislature intended the statute to apply to motor vehicles, it would have said
so. A search of the Idaho statutes utilizing the Westlaw database by the undersigned
located 53 statutes where the Idaho legislature used the word ''automobile," 970
statutes using "motor vehicle" and 1170 statutes which referred to "vehicle." Among
these statutes is [Idaho Code § 37-2737A(2)] where the legislature expanded the
common definition of "premises," in that statute only, to include motor vehicles:
As used in this section, premises means any:
(a) motor vehicle or vessel;
(b) dwelling or rental unit including, but not limited to, apartment, townhouse,
condominium, mobile home, manufactured home, motel room or hotel room;
(c) Dwelling house, its curtilage and any other outbuildings.
I.C. § 37-2737A(2) (emphasis added). [statute governing the manufacture or delivery
of controlled substances where children are present].
Of course, no such expansive definition of premises is contained in the frequenting
statute, Idaho Code § 37-2732(d), and no mention is made of the statue being
applicable to motor vehicles.
As the legislature has not specifically defined
"premises" or "premises of any place" to include a motor vehicle, the ordinary
definition applies which would exclude motor vehicles. To the extent this Court
concludes that this statute is ambiguous, it must apply the doctrine of lenity and
construe the statute in the favor of the accused. [State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 156,
75 P.3d 206,210 (Ct. App. 203)].
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 7-8. The legislature was able to define
"premises" to include a motor vehicle when it wished to prohibit that manufacture or
delivery of controlled substances in the presence of children.
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2737A(2). Idaho Code§ 37-2737A(2) is in the same title and chapter as Idaho Code§ 372732( d); yet the broader definition of "premises" is limited only to the application of Idaho
Code§ 37-2737A.

In analyzing this section, it is important to begin with the plain language of the statute.
Generally, the words of a statute must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and
the statute must be construed as a whole. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25
P.3d 850 (2001). The statute states that it is "unlawful to be at or on the premises of any
place" where illegal controlled substances are used, manufactured, or distributed.

The

prepositional phrase, ''of any place" modifies the noun, "premises." Premises and place are
not used in the disjunctive: the statute does not prohibit a person's presence at a premises or
a place; it prohibits a person's presence on a premises.

Turning first to the meaning of the word, "place," it is noted that when used as a noun, the
word, "place" has many meanings, including, for example, the indication of a particular
passage or page in a book, such as to mark one's place; or the word "place" can mean the
concept of position or standing, especially one of impo1iance, such as to indicate a person's
place in history. In the context of Idaho Code § 37-2732(d), the following definitions of
"place" are applicable: "7. a residence; dwelling; house and grounds 8. a building or space
devoted to a special purpose (a place of amusement). WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (2

nd

college edition 1970), p. 1086-87. Looking at the plain

language of the statute, the prepositional phrase, "of any place," means that premises is not
limited to a house, but includes any residence, any building, and any space devoted to a
special purpose, such as a business or an office. The phrase, "of any place," clarifies that the
scope of the statute is not limited to a house or a residence, but includes a wide variety of
fixed locations.
The statute prohibits a person's presence at or on the "premises of any place." The word
"premises" is the focal point of the statutory prohibition. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines "premises" as a "plural noun - a house or building, together with its land and
P'i" 10
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outbuildings, occupied by a business or considered in an official context." The MerriamWebster Online Dictionary defines "premises" as: "3 plural [from its being identified in the
premises of the deed] a : a tract of land with the buildings thereon b : a building or part of a
building usually with its appurtenances (as grounds)." Here again, the words used include
the concept of a fixed location on a specific piece of ground. The plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning of the word "premises" includes a permanent, fixed, stationary piece of land, and
the buildings on that land. Looking at the plain meaning of the phrase, "premises of any
place," it means the buildings, outbuildings, and grounds of any fixed location, whether that
location is a house, an apartment, a building, a business, a place of commerce, an office, or
any other definite, permanent, established location. The "premises of any place" does not
include a "mobile domain" such as a motor vehicle or a boat.
D. Knowledge of the Presence of Drugs.

All four of the officers in this case indicated that knowledge of drugs being present is a
critical element of a charge for frequenting. This is substantiated by Idaho case law on the
issue. In State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 688 P.2d 1203 ((1984), the defendant argued that
even if a search wanant for his home was valid, the search of his person was not. He asked
the trial court to suppress evidence that drugs were found on his person. The trial court
denied the motion to suppress; and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of

Appeals noted that the law enforcement officers actually made two arrests, the first of which,
an a1Test for frequenting, was illegal. The officers made the first anest when Crabb opened
the door to the mobile home. The Court of Appeals stated:
As explained more fully below, there were actually two arrests. The first
occurred before the police entered the mobile home. At that time, Crabb was
told he was being arrested for "frequenting," in reference to LC. § 37-2732(d).
This statute makes it a misdemeanor for a person to "frequent places where he
knows illegal controlled substances are being held for distribution,
transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away,"
"A peace officer may ... without a wa1nnt, anest a person: 1) For a public
offense committed in his presence." Idaho Code § 19-603. Therefore, the
question is whether Crabb violated Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) in the presence
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of the arresting officer. We cannot conclude that he did. The statute requires
that a person "frequent a place where he knows illegal substances are being
held for distribution," etc. (Emphasis added). The statute precludes the
interpretation that a person violates the statute simply by his presence at a
place where controlled substances are sold.

Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 303.

(Emphasis added).

As discussed at length above, the

legislature revised Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) to eliminate the requirement that the person be
"frequenting" a place.

While the revised statute makes a person's mere presence on a

premises a criminal act, the requirement of knowledge remains the same. Presence must be
coupled with knowledge. In Crabb, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the officers did not
have reason to suspect that Crabb knew, at the time of the first arrest, that illegal substances
were being held at that premises.

The holding in Crabb underscores the fact that actual

knowledge of the presence of illegal drugs is an element of the crime.
Knowledge of the presence of illegal drugs can become a critical issue. In this case, the

.

question of when Witness #1 had knowledge that drugs were present becomes problematic.
Witness #1 stated that he knew Witness #2 had marijuana at his home; however he did not
know that Witness #2 had marijuana in his car until the car was moving and they were en
route to lunch. The impo1tance of knowledge of the presence of drugs is further illustrated
by the prosecutorial agency's decision to dismiss the case. Witness #1 claimed, and the State
could not disprove, that Witness #1 did not know that drugs were present when he entered
the vehicle.

Moreover, Witness #1 did not re-enter the vehicle after the marijuana was

discovered.

At one point, Witness # 1 asked one of the officers whether the law required him to jump out
of the car as soon as he knew his friend had drugs. This question illustrates the problem of
considering a vehicle, particularly a moving vehicle, to be "a premises of any place."
Assuming that the officers' interpretation is correct, and that Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) places
a duty on a person to leave the company of anyone known to be in the possession of drugs, it
must be conceded that leaving a moving vehicle can be difficult.
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Even if the car has stopped moving, it is questionable whether the law should require that a
juvenile become abandoned somewhere without transportation because the person with
whom the juvenile was riding turns out to be in the possession of drugs. Even assuming that
a vehicle is a "premises," where there is no indication that Witness. #1 entered the car with
knowledge of the presence of drugs, a legitimate question arises as to whether his subsequent
presence in the car is sufficient to trigger criminal liability under Idaho Code § 37-2732(d).
The prosecutorial agency apparently determined that it did not.

D. Conclusion.
Officer #1 's interpretation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) is similar to other members of the
department in ten11S of the statute's application to vehicles.
I

The preponderance of the

evidence indicates that it has been the long-time practice of the officers in the Boise Police
Depa1iment to interpret Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) to include vehicles. In addition, some
officers read the word, "premises," even more broadly to include, not only a vehicle, but any
location, public or private. Looking at the statute through the lens of police department use
and practice, Officer #1 's interpretation of the statute appears to be a well-accepted
depa1imental interpretation that is consistent with the training provided by other members of
the department.
Officer #1 applied the statute in a manner consistent with department training and practice.
His application of the law appears to be a department-wide interpretation; it was not a
questionable interpretation by a single officer. The plain reading of the term, "the premises
of any place," is that it applies to a fixed location only. The term "premises" does not
include a motor vehicle that is being used as a means of transportation. Officer #1 applied
the law in the manner consistent with department training and consistent with the
department's understanding of the statute. Because this is a training issue, I conclude that
there is no policy violation and that Officer # I should be exonerated.
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II.

Performance of Duty and Impartial and Objective Discharge of
Duties.

A. Use of Profanity.

The last two issues in this case revolve around Officer #1 's statement referring to Witness #1
as a "lying little asshole." The statement was made to one of the other officers at the scene
after Witness #1 and Witness #2 had left the scene.

Officer #1 's actions following his

discovery that his audiotape was still running indicate that he was aware that the statement
was objectionable. He laughed and then stated loudly into the audio recorder, "What I meant
to say was ifhe was not being honest T should probably [recording ends]."
The Boise Police Depa1iment's policy(§ 11.01.07) Relationships with Others and Demeanor
states:

An employee shall treat all other persons in a civil and respectful manner.
He/she shall not use profanity or un.complimenta,y speech in the presence of
members of the public, prisoners, or other persons he/she has contact with
nor shall he/she intentional~y antagonize any person.
This policy applies to police conduct with respect to "members of the public, prisoners, or
other persons [the officer] has contact with." (Emphasis added). Though the thrust of this
policy section is to prohibit the use of profanity when an officer is engaged with civilians, as
written, this policy section could be seen as extending the prohibition to include contact with
colleagues as well as with members of the public. However, this policy section has not been
interpreted to have this meaning; nor has it been applied in such a manner.
The present case illustrates the potential negative consequences when a professional law
enforcement officer uses vulgar, derogatory language with reference to a member of the
public even when the comment is made outside the presence of the public.

Though the

comment was made to a colleague who apparently did not find the language objectionable, it
was recorded. The recording was transcribed and eventually relayed not only to Witness #1,
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but also his parents, Witness #1 's defense lawyer, and the prosecutor. According to Officer
#1, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the case because the comment had been recorded.
While the Prosecutor's Office explained that the case was dismissed because the State could
not disprove Witness #l's story, it would be unfo11unate to have an officer's use of profanity
detract in any way from the prosecution of a criminal charge.
Boise Police Department Policy prohibits the use of profanity. Though the policy is directed
toward maintaining professional relations between officers and the public, the fact that the
policy is not interpreted to include interactions with colleagues does not mean that the use of
offensive language is acceptable anytime the public is out of earshot. The policy should not
be seen as unintentionally encouraging officers to use language that might be vulgar or
distasteful. The use of unprofessional language can have consequences even where it is not
spoken directly to the public. In this case, the prosecutorial agency chose to dismiss the case
on the basis of its inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Witness #I had
knowledge that drugs were present; but Officer #1 's understanding off the situation was that
his recorded comment may have contributed to the decision. ft would be unfortunate if a
police officer's choice of language detracted from the prosecution of a criminal case.
Officer# 1 used profanity, but did not do so in the presence of a member of the public. For
the reasons set forth above, I conclude find that Officer #1 did not violate Boise Police
Department's policy (§ 11.01.07) Relationships with Others and Demeanor and that the
charge is unfounded.

B. Lack of Objectivity and Impartiality.

The Complainants allege that Officer #1 's use of derogatory and objectionable language to
describe a juvenile also call into question his objectivity and impartiality. For this reason, his
statement must be evaluated under the Boise Police Department's policy (§ 11 .03 .04)
Performance of Duty, which states:
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An employee shall pe,form his/her duties in an objective, impartial, and firm
manner. He/she shall act with other employees to assist and protect each
other in the maintenance of law and order.
According to the Complainants, Officer #1 's use of a derogatory term, combined with a
statement that Witness #1 was lying, raise a concern that Officer #1 filed a questionable
charge against Witness# I in retaliation for Witness # 1's perceived behavior.
Officer #1 stated in his interview that he had known Witness #1 at school, and believed that
he knew him by name. Witness # 1 confinned that he had had prior contact with Officer # 1
in the context of school activities. Officer #1 had not called Witness #1 into his office for
law enforcement reasons.

These facts indicate that there was no pre-existing lack of

objectivity.

Officer #1 performed field sobriety tests on Witness #1. These tests did not yield facts
indicating that Witness #1 was under the influence; however, Officer #1 noted that Witness
#1 had "a hell of a eye-f1utter." For this reason, Officer #1 believed that Witness #1 was not
being truthful about either having smoked marijuana or having been present when Witness
#2 was smoking marijuana.

Though Officer #1 made an unfortunate word choice in

expressing his doubts regarding Witness #1 's truthfulness, his concerns regarding Witness
#1 's honesty were genuine and based on results he obtained as a result of legitimately
performed field tests.

In addition, as was discussed above, the charge of frequenting appears to have been made
within the parameters of accepted departmental practice.

Officer #1 's law enforcement

decisions were not arbitrary or capricious. His judgments, however poorly worded, were
based on the facts that he gathered throughout the course of the incident. His decision to
charge Witness #1 with frequenting was based on an interpretation of the law that is accepted
by other officers in the department. For these reasons, even though the officers' reading of
the frequenting statute may be stretched beyond the plain meaning of the actual wording of
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the statute, and even though Officer #1 chose to express his opinion about Witness #1 's
veracity in less than professional terms, the underlying opinion and the decision to file a
criminal charge do not evidence a lack of impartiality or objectivity.

POLICY FINDINGS

Officer #1:
P.M. § 11.03.02 - Performance of Duty- Based on a preponderance of the evidence, a
finding of exonerated is recommended.

P.M. § 11.01.07 - Relationships with Others and Demeanor - Based on the preponderance of
the evidence, a finding of unfounded is recommended.

P.M. § 11.03.04- General Discharge of Duties - Based on a preponderance of the evidence,
a finding of exonerated is recommended.
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POLICY AND TRAINING REVIEW

It is recommended that the department obtain a legal review of the interpretation ofldaho
Code§ 37-2732(d) and that the statute be applied in a manner consistent with that review. It
is noted that there are some variations in interpretation of the statute from one officer to
another. For this reason, it is also recommended that officer training address the issue in
order to effect a consistent, department-wide application of the statute.

Pierce Murphy
Community Ombudsman
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500
(208) 395-7859
mailbox@boiseombudsman.org
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ERIN E. TOMLIN
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
CITY OF MOSCOW
POBox9203
Moscow,Idaho 83843-0568
Phone: (208) 883-7000
ISB No. 9035

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DANIEL AMSTAD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2017-0230
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and submits the following Supplemental Response to the
Request for Discovery:
Additional reports relevant to the issues in the above-referenced matter and
intended to be introduced or the subject of witness testimony are as follows:
1/30/17
10/23/16
10/22/16
8/29/16
4/2/16
2/6/16

17-M01054
16-M09449
16-M09425
16-M07532
16-M02799
16-M0l 106

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY: PAGE -1 -
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Witnesses subpoenaed by the State are:
1.
2.
3.

Officer Joe Sieverding, MPD
Christopher A. Hughes
Noah A. Sharp

Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, if the Prosecutor discovers
additional evidence or the evidence of an additional witness or witnesses, or decides to use
additional evidence, witness or witnesses, such evidence shall automatically be subject to
discovery and inspection.

r;..~

DATED this _o_·_\ day of

Erin E. Tomlin
Prosecuting Attorney

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY: PAGE - 2 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the Plaintiff's Supplemental Discovery
Response were served on the following in the manner indicated below:

[] U.S. Mail

[ ] Overnight Mail
[]~
H'Hand Delivery

Andrea Hunter
Attorney for Defendant
Courthouse Mail
Moscow, ID 83843

Dated this

_'.aj day of ~

,2o_ll-.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY: PAGE - 3 -
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CI1Y OF MOSCOW
ERIN TOMLIN
Prosecuting Attorney
City Hall
P.O. Box 9203
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Phone: (208) 883-7005
Facsimile: (208) 883-7018
ISB No. 9035

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

V.

)
)

)
)

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
Defendant.

)
)

Case No. CR-2017-0230
RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS

)
)

The State of Idaho, by and through Erin Tomlin, City of Moscow Prosecuting
Attorney, and Legal Intern, Scott T. Ugelstad, submits its response to the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
FACTS

On January 30, 2017, at approximately 10:40 pm, Officer Joe Sieverding noticed a
Honda Accord with fogged windows parked in the west Wallace Complex parking lot.
This lot, located across the street from the Wallace Complex dorms, has beeri the location
of a number of drug related incidents involving Officer Sieverding alone. Sieve:i;-ding
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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approached the car on foot and, as he got closer, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana
coming from the Honda. The vehicle was not running and, seeing three males inside, he
walked up and knocked on the passenger window. As Daniel Amstad, the Defendant,
opened the passenger door, Sieverding could see the driver, CH, hide a plastic baggie
under his seat. CH also had what appeared to be marijuana residue spilled on his lap.
Sieverding, who noticed the baggie, asked CH where the marijuana was and CH handed
him a small sandwich bag from under the seat containing about 16.Sg of marijuana.
Sieverding then asked what they used to smoke the marijuana with and CH handed him
a large glass bong from the back seat.
Sieverding then asked the occupants to step outside of the vehicle while he
conducted a search. The search resulted in the discovery of one gallon sized Ziploc bag
with approximately 46.Sg of marijuana in the trunk and other various paraphernalia
throughout the vehicle. Before the seru;ch ended, CH also pulled an AMS digital scale
from his pocket and handed it to a covering officer. Sieverding asked CH if he was selling
marijuana. CH said no but he lets people use his Honda to smoke marijuana. The
passenger from the back seat, Noah Sharp, said that they walked from the dorms to
smoke marijuana in CH's car. Sieverding then cited Amstad and Sharp with frequenting
pursuant to I.C.

§

37-2732(d) and told CH, a juvenile, that he would be forwarding

possession of marijuana charges to the Latah County Prosecutor's Office.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Page: 2

The Defendant moves to dismiss, claiming LC. § 37-2732(d) does not apply to
occupants in a vehicle. The State responds, and respectfully requests this Court to deny
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
LAW AND ARGUMENT

Amstad violated LC.§ 37-:-273~(d) because by walking from the dorms to a car in a
nearby parking lot for the purpose of smoking marijuana, he was present at a place where
he knew illegal controlled substances were being held for use, delivery, or to be given
away. The question presented to this Court is whether a person can be "present at or on
the premises of any place" if they are in a vehicle. Because there is no controlling case law
on this issue, Defendant has attached two magistrate court's decisions on pre-trial
motions and an Ombudsman's Report for insight. Although these opinions address a
similar issue, all three present vastly different factual scenarios than the one we are faced
with.here.
A car used for travelling is not a "place" as defined in LC.§ 37-2732(d). In all three
scenarios the Defendant provided, the individual charged with violating§ 37-2732(d) was
in a car used for travelling. See Traveller (officer saw the vehicle pull into a parking lot);
Reid (defendant knew there were controlled substances in the vehicle in which she was
travelling); Ombudsman's Report (students left school, parked in a private lot, and walked
to get lunch). The significance of using a car to travel is further supported by the emphasis
all three opinions place on "a fixed location" when defining a "place" or "premises."
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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Here, the stationary Honda in the Wallace complex parking lot was not used for
traveling, but for smoking marijuana. Unlike the vehicles in the three opinions that were
used for travelling, CH' s Honda was in a fixed position, parked, stationary, and not even
running. Not only did CH admit that he lets his friends use his car for smoking marijuana,
Sharp, the passenger in the backseat, stated that they walked from the dorms to the car
to smoke marijuana. Based on these facts, the Honda was not used for travel, but as a
place that the three friends walked to for the purpose of smoking marijuana.
In addition to the cars being used for travel, none of the three scenarios presented
any indication that the drugs were going to be anything more than present in the vehicles.
In fact, in Traveller and the Ombudsman's Report, the vehicles were unoccupied when
the marijuana was spotted. Also, of the few facts stated in Reid, there was no indication
that the drugs were anything other than merely present in the travelling vehicle. Here,
however, there is ample evidence that Amstad and/ or his friends intended to smoke the
marijuana in the Honda. Not only do we have the admissions that the car is used for
smoking and that the three walked from their dorms to the car to smoke marijuana, there
is physical evidence to corroborate those statements. Green marijuana residue was spilled
over CH's lap, a baggie of marijuana was under the driver's seat, and CH indicated they
were going to use a large glass bong in the backseat to smoke it.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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The Ombudsman's Report .expressed concern that an expansive interpretation of
the statute could cause people to become "trapped." The Report posed _the following
hypothetical:

If person' A' wen~ attending a concert at a public concert house, and persons
sitting near 'A' began smoking marijuana cigarettes, under the
interpretation put forward by the officer, 'A' could be charged with
frequenting.' A' probably paid for a ticket to enter the concert venue and
would be disinclined to leave the concert simply because people in the
vicinity were smoking marijuana. 'A' may also find the marijuana smoke
objectionable and disapprove of the activity. Nonetheless, under the
interpretation put forth by the officers, "A" has a duty to leave the premises
or risk being charged with frequenting. Under that interpretation, 'A' does
not have the right to remain in a place open to the public, even if 'A' paid
for the privilege of.being there."
Also, the Report indicated that people travelling in cars were considered trapped as well.
The Report stated, "At one point, Witness #1 asked one of the officers whether the law
required him to jump out of the car as soon as he knew his friend had drugs. This question
illustrates the problem of considering a vehicle, particular a moving vehicle, to be 'a
premises of any place."'
Although this is a valid concern to raise, it does not apply to the facts presented
here. Neither Amstad nor any of his friends were trapped in the Honda. Unlike person
'A' in the hypothetical who paid to enter a venue and was unaware, possibly
objectionable, to the use of marijuana, Amstad was well aware that CH' s Honda was
going to be used for smoking marijuana. Even if, arguendo, he was unaware until after he

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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entered the car, he was free to leave after his discovery and walk back to his dorm.
Instead, he chose to stay and was in no way "trapped."
Because of these key fact distinctions, the decisions of the Defendant's attached
opinions should be of little to no persuasion in this case.
Although plain meaning and the rule of lenity are routinely used to interpret a
statute, if that interpretation yields absurd results, it is no longer the most reasonable
interpretation. See e.g., United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) ("No rule of
construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently ab~urd
consequences.").
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd result,"
. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504,509, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 104
L.Ed.2d 557 (1989), we must search for other evidence of congressional
intent to lend the term its proper scope. See also, e.g., Church of the Holy
Trinity, supra, 143 U.S., at 472, 12 S.Ct., at 516; FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,
476 U.S. 426, 432, 106 S.Ct. 1931, 1935, 90 L.Ed.2d 428 (1986).

Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,454 (1989).
Interpreting LC.§ 37-2732(d) to not include CH's Honda as a "place" would lead
to absurd results. If CH's Honda is not considered a "place" on these facts, then no car
could ever be considered a place under this statute. If this happened, it would create a
loophole sanctuary for not only students, but everyone with access to a car. Under
Defendant's proposed interpretation, anyone, especially students, could get a group of
people, walk to their car, use any drug, and be immune from LC.§ 37,.2732(d). Instead of
gathering inside a building and risking a violation, people could take a couple steps
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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outside to their car and be protected from the statute because it is not a "place." It is true
that occupants could be charged with other crimes such as possession. However, if one
occupant claims ownership to everything (as is the case here), the other occupants would
likely be free to go, even if they partook in using the drugs as well.
Defendant's interpretation would also lead to absurd results because it would not
apply to mobile homes, trailers, or RVs. Under Defe~dant's proposed ~terpretation,
mobile homes, trailers, or RVs would not be considered a "premises" or "place" because
· they are vehicles. It requires little to no explanation why it would be absurd to exclude
say, a mobile meth lab, from the definition of "place."
In addition to absurdity~ courts can also c.onsider potential consequences and
effects when construing criminal statutes. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690 (2004) ("In
construing criminal statutes, courts are free to coTIS1der effect and consequence of
differing and available constructions of a statute."). Right now, as enforcement includes
cars such as CH' s Honda, students in dorms walk to their cars to smoke marijuana
because it is difficult to conceal in their rooms. Under Defendant's proposed construction
of the statute, students will be immune from LC.§ 37-2732(d) if they just simply walk to
their cars. This creates even more incentive to smoke marijuana in their cars.
Not only will the increased activity in the parking lots lead to more drug use and
law violations such as possession, it would create a major risk to society as well. The more
students that feel free to smoke marijuana in their cars without fear of LC.§ 37-2732(d),
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Page: 7

the more students who will be behind a wheel. With the convenience of already being
behind the wheel, there would be little stopping them from driving away while possibly
under the influence. This interpretation would essentially incentivize students to be
behind a wheel while under the influence and increase the likelihood of those students
driving.
For these reasons, Defendant's proposed interpretation would lead to an absurd
result and not what the legislature intended.
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny the
Defendant's Motion fo Dismiss .
~

J 1 day of April, 2017.
.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Erin Tomlin
Prosecuting Atturney

Legal Intern
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS was
_

mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid

/ "hand delivered
_

sent by facsimile, original by mail
emailed

to the following:

D. RAY BARKER LAW OFFICE
Andrea Hunter, ISB# 9515
Attorney at Law

P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843-011~

Tel: (408) 882-6749

Dated this

d~ of April, 2017.
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IN THE DISCTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T ~ { ~ DEPUTY
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

.

r

Case No. CR-2017-230

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

DANIEL AMSTAD,
Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

Based on the findings and conclusions announced in open court;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and
this case is DISMISSED.

"2-0fv

-·

h_ f

Dated this_·_ day of _ J _ J _ J ~ , 2017, nunc pro tune to April 27, 2017.
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ORDER DISMISSING CASE - I

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the,(} day of [\,J')\\~v~Ol 7, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served, by ±~lass m a ~ prepaid, and addressed to, or by
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by
facsimile:

Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
522 S. Adams St.
Moscow, Idaho 83843
[ ]

First-class mail
~ Hand-delivered
[ ]
Facsimile

Andrea Hunter
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843

[]

c?kt__
[]

First-class mail
Hand-delivered
Facsimile

t------

B~..,,._j...,.,l._......

ORDER DISMISSING CASE - 2

-
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I

LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR1S OFFICE
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568
Phone: (208) 883-2246
ISB No. 2613

I

2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)

)
)

Case No. CR-2017-230

V.

)
)
)

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION
OF ATTORNEY

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
Defendant.

__________))
COME NOW the Moscow City Attorney and the Latah County Prosecutor and
hereby stipulate that the Latah County Prosecutor's Office is substituted for the
Moscow City Attorney's Office and shall henceforth represent the Plaintiff as the
attorney of record in the above-entitled action.
THEREFORE, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that all papers and documents in
said action are to be served on the Latah County Prosecutor's Office, P.O. Box 8068,
Moscow, Idaho 83843.
1

_//·D~-(_D
_ _,.....5Ji.is ___ day :.~~~-!2:__~--_
c__...---~---·...-r·· -~"'.7 _,.,

r

.. ~ __..

~~--------

.,.,--;

William W. ThOil),pfun,
Prosecuting Att€rney
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'

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION
OF ATTORNEY: Page -1-
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--~

I..

\

(\

nn_

\ ; ~

- - - - " - · - - - 1 < - - - - ·- - - - - ~ - - -

Rod Hall
Moscow City Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION
OF ATTORNEY were served on the following in the manner indicated below:
Andrea Hunter
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9408
Moscow, ID 83843

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[]~
[q"Hand Delivery

Rod Hall
Moscow City Attorney
P.O .. Box 9203
Moscow, ID 83843

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail

Dated this

6'.µ._

NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION
OF ATTORNEY: Page-2-

[] F_JX
['1"Hand Delivery

day of May, 2017.

LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
KEITH SCHOLL
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Latah County Courthouse
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-2246
ISB No. 10062
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

V.

)

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CR-2017-0000230'
NOTICE OF APPEAL

The State ofldaho, by and through Latah County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Keith
Scholl, submit this Notice of Appeal and hereby appeals the Magistrate Judge's Order
Dismissing Case. This notice of appeal is made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1 (c).
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.4, the State provides the following information:
(a) The title of the action or proceeding is State ofldaho versus Daniel C. Amstad.

(b) The title of the court which heard the proceedings appealed from is the Magistrate,
Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Latah, and the
presiding magistrate was the Honorable John C. Judge.
(c) The number assigned to the action of proceedings by the trial court is Latah County Case

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -1-

. t'" ·, ',-0 fl. 0 0 41 6
·_ :

\, f

·, ·.c::=-:

-

-

No. CR-2017-0000230
(d) The title of the court to which this appeal is taken is the District Court of the Second
Judicial District, in and for the County of Latah.
(e) The date of the judgment, decision or order from which the appeal is taken is April 28,
201 7 as evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court. The hearing and oral pronouncement
occurred on April 27, 2017. The heading is "Order Dismissing Case."
(f) The appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law.·
(g) The testimony and proceedings in the original hearing were recorded by audiotape,
which is in the possession of the Clerk of the District Court of Latah County.
(h) A certificate that the notice of appeal has been served personally or by mailing upon the

opposing party's attorney is attached to this notice.
(i) The State intends to assert in the appeal that the Magistrate Judge erred in his
interpretation ofldaho Code 37-2732(d). In particular, the Magistrate erred by holding that a
parking lot belonging to the University ofldaho where Defendant is alleged to have violated the
statute does not come within the purview of the statute.
DATED this \t>~day of May, 2017.

-~
£d
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -2-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal
was
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid

L

hand delivered

__ sent by facsimile, original by mail
to the following:
Hon. John R. Stegner
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843
Andrea Hunter
D. Ray Barker Law Office
Courthouse Mail
522 S. Adams St.
Moscow, ID 83843
Dated this l..Dtlt day of May, 2017.

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -3-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR-2017-230

)

Plaintiff,)
)

)
)
)

vs.
DANIEL C. AMSTAD,

)

Defendant. )
__________

-----'-

)

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF MOTION TO DISMISS
BEFORE THE
HONORABLE JOHN C. JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DATE:

TIME: 3:11 P.M.

April 27, 2017

- 1 -

ORIGINAL
000071 9

APPEARANCES

FOR THE STATE:

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

SCOTT UGELSTAD, INTERN WITH
LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR
ERIN TOMLIN, CITY PROSECUTOR
SUPERVISING ATTORNEY
MOSCOW, ID 83843

ANDREA HUNTER, APPEARING FOR
D. RAY BARKER, PUBLIC DEFENDER
MOSCOW, ID 83843

- 2 -

000080

WITNESSES

FOR THE STATE:
JOSEPH SIEVERDING

Direct examination by Mr. Ugelstad
Cross examination by Ms. Hunter

9
16
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1

-

MOSCOW, IDAHO, THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2017, AT 3:11 P.M.

2
3

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, everybody.

Uhm,

4

just let me explain my momentary delay here.

5

reasons is I--

6

sharing this because it's relevant to the case because I

7

made an inquiry about legislative history; whether or

8

not it's relevant or not, I don't know.

9

hear--

I got an email, uhm,--

One of the

and I'm just

hear argument, but I guess the--

I mean, I'll
the good news

10

or the bad news, depending on how you want to look at

11

it, is there really isn't significant legislative

12

history on this, you know, to guide our--

13

our inquiry.

14

maybe we'll be talking about legislative history and

15

maybe we won't, but I did want to tell you that.

16
17

But I wanted to let you know that and

So, uh, we are on the record in Daniel Amstad,
C-R--

is it Amstad, is that right?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

our, uh,--

That is-

Correct pronunci-- the traditional way to

pronounce it.

22

THE COURT:

23

THE DEFENDANT:

How do you pronounce it?
Uhm, Amstad.
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THE COURT:

1

Amstad, okay.

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

Correct.

Okay.

I'll pronounce it that way,

4
5

Amstad.

6

Hunter.

7

Latah County Prosecutor's Office.

8

Sieverding.

Okay.

Mr. Amstad is here, represented by Ms.

Mr. Ugelstad is here representing the State,

MR. UGELSTAD:

9

10
11

Moscow.

12

did I say?

THE COURT:

16
17

City of Moscow, I apologize.

What

Oh, you're representing the City of Moscow?

THE COURT:

14
15

Uh, Your Honor, it's City of

MR. UGELSTAD:

13

With him is Officer

Yes, Your Honor.

Okay.

You're sitting in for Ms.

Tomlin?
MR. UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

Great.

I'm always--

I'm

18

always saying that the prosecutors are no longer

19

fungible, but I guess maybe there is some--

20

that going on.

21

we're just having--

22

about the application of this statute, is that right?

-23

But you have Officer Sieverding here from Moscow Police

24

Department; is he here to testify?

25

So, uhm,--

some of

so, is it my understanding

having a legal argument about the--

MR. UGELSTAD:

Just in case, Your Honor.

-

We--
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1

we haven't actually hashed that out yet, so-

2

THE COURT:

Just in case.

MS. HUNTER:

Okay.

I think we're going to stipulate

3

4

to some facts and he didn't know if I was going to

5

stipulate to some facts, and so, I mean, in--

6

purpose of arguing the motion.

7

wanted to--

8
9

he broughtTHE COURT:

for the

And, so, uhm, he want-

I mean, he didn't know if I was going to so

Okay.

So, what are we doing?

Are

10

we stipulating to facts or do you want to just establish

11
12

a factual record?
MS. HUNTER:

13

going to stop speaking for him.

We don't--

14

Go ahead.

15

MR. UGELSTAD:

16
17
18

I mean, I--

I'm

Well, I was going to say, could

we have a moment so we could decide-THE COURT:

sure.

MR. UGELSTAD:

uhm, which-

19

THE COURT:

Yeah.

20

MR. UGELSTAD:

21

THE COURT:

22

that you have your--

23

mean, you want to have some factual record here because,

24

either way, I mean, this--

25

subject to appeal.

Alright.

I mean, I-your con--

I want to--

before--

conversation, but, I

this is, uh, definitely

I think there's--

- 6 -

I mean, as--

as

1

you know, I mean, there have been different applications

2

of this statute.

3

through a--

4

it's got some issues.

5

we'll likely, one way or the other, get some

6

clarification no matter what I decide from either the

7

Court or the legislature.

8

want me to--

9

minute?

It's--

a few revisions, uhm, and it's, uhm,-So, uh,--

So, go ahead and--

do you

Sure.

MR. UGELSTAD:

11

and, so, I think, uh,

do you want me to go off the record for a

MS. HUNTER:

10

it's kind of mutated, uh,

THE COURT:

Sure, yeah.

Okay.

Just go off the record and

12
13

talk about what we want to talk about.
MR. UGELSTAD:

14
15
16

Thank you.

[WHEREUPON THE HEARING WAS RECESSED AT 3:15

17

P.M., RECONVENING AT 3:17 P.M., COURT, COUNSEL AND THE

18

DEFENDANT BEING PERSONALLY PRESENT AS BEFORE.]

19
MR. UGELSTAD:

20
21

The State calls Officer

Sieverding to the stand.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Officer Sieverding, step on

22
23

up please.
MS. HUNTER:

24

25

I don't think we're on the

record.

-
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THE COURT:

1

Yes, we are.

That's what that--

those numbers are.

2

Oh, okay.

MS. HUNTER:

3

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:

6

Okay.
Sorry.
Yeah, thank you.
I just thought you went off, so I

MS. HUNTER:

7

for-

8

THE COURT:

9

We did, but-

MS. HUNTER:

10

to announcethen I think we got--

THE COURT:

11

12
13
14
15

went

back on.
MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Just wanted to make sure.

Myranda's right on top of it, I'm

telling you.

16

MS. HUNTER:

She's on the ball.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. UGELSTAD:

19

MS. HUNTER:

20

MYRANDA WESTERMAN:

She's really good.
She's on it.
She's very good.
Do you solemnly swear or

21

affirm that the testimony you give in this case shall be

22

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth

23

under the penalty of perjury?

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

I do.
Alright.

Thank you, Sir.

Go
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1

ahead and have a seat there and then please state your

2

name and spell your last.
THE WITNESS:

My name is Joseph Sieverding;

3

4

that's S-I-E-V, as in Victor, E-R-D-I-N-G.
THE COURT:

5

6

Alright.

Thank you.

Mr. Ugelstad.

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOSEPH SIEVERDING

7

8

9

BY MR. UGELSTAD:

10
11

Q

Officer Sieverding, where are you currently

A

Moscow Police Department.

Q

How long have you worked for the Moscow

employed?

12
13
14
15
16

Police Department?
A

Uh, over five years now.

Q

Can you briefly describe your training?

A

Yes.

I graduated from P.O.S.T. Academy.

17
18

Uhm, I graduated the F-T-0 program, and I am currently

19

an F-T-O myself.

20

21
22

Q

Does that mean you're P.O.S.T. certified?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

I'd like to turn your attention to

23

January thirtieth, two thousand seventeen, were you

24

working that day?

25

A

Yes.

- 9 -
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Q

Where were you working at about ten-forty

3

A

The U of I campus, in the dorm Wallace

4

Complex lot.

5

Q

Is that in the City of Moscow, State of

A

Yes.

Q

What were you duties at that time?

A

Patrol.

Q

What happened at about ten-forty P.M.?

A

I was in the West Wallace Complex parking

1

2

P.M.?

Idaho?

6

7
8
9

10
11

12

lot in my vehicle.

I saw a parked vehicle, a parked

13

Honda with fogged windows in the parking lot.

14

Q

Was that vehicle moving or--

or running?

15

A

Uh, I don't recall if it was running or

16

not, but it was parked, uh, with the fogged windows.in

17

the lot.

18

Q

And what did you do next?

19

A

I exited my vehicle.

Uh, parked my

20

vehicle, exited my vehicle, walked up to the Honda, the

21

passenger side.

22

from the vehicle, I could smell the odor of--

23

odor of marijuana.

24
25

Uh, when I was about five feet away
a strong

Uhm,--

Q

How strong was that odor?

A

Not as strong as, uh, when I knocked on the

- 10 -

000088

1

door and the door was actually opened.

2

walked up, it was--

3

4
5

6

But when I

it was strong.

Q

Uh, how many people were inside?

A

Three.

Q

What did you do after, uhm, knocking on the

A

So, I--

window?

7
8

window.

9

opened, the--

I tapped on the passenger side

Mr. Amstad opened the door.

When the door was

the odor was even stronger.

I looked

10

inside the vehicle with my flashlight and the driver,

11

uh, Mr. Hughes, stuffed a, uhm,--

12

under his seat.

13

with my flashlight, on his lap there was green

14

marijuana--

15

or residu~ on his pants.

16

a sandwich baggie

Uh, when I wa~ looking at Mr. Hughes

what appeared to be green marijuana flake

Q

And to clarify, uh, what seat was Mr.

A

The pass--

19

Q

And Mr. Hughes?

20
21

A

Driver's seat.

Q

Uh, when you were approaching this vehicle,

17
18

Amstad in?
front passenger side.

22

did you see anyone--

23

anyone leave or, uh, enter the vehicle?

24
25

or at all times, did you see

A

No.

Q

And who was the person that opened the door

-
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1

that was in the front passenger seat?

2
3

4
5

6

A

Mr. Amstad.

Q

Is that person in the courtroom today?

A

Yes.

Q

Could you please point him out and describe

what he's wearing?

7

A

8

white shirt.

9

Q

And where is he sitting?

10

A

He's sitting with, uh, the defense table.

11

MR. UGELSTAD:

12
13

He's wearing a, uh, collared, uh, black and

Let the record reflect that the

witness has identified the defendant, Mr. Amstad.
THE COURT:

Okay.

14
15
16

[MR. UGELSTAD CONTINUING)
Q

After yous--

after you saw Mr. Hughes

17

hide the bag, uh, the little baggie, what--

18

happened next?

19

A

So I asked him--

what

I asked him for the bag

20

of marijuana.

It was pretty evident to me what it was.

21

Uh, Mr. Hughes handed me the bag of marijuana.

22

what they were--

23

what they were going to smoke it with.

24

answering that, he reached into the back seat and handed

25

me a bong, a marijuana bong with residue.

I asked

I asked for either a pipe or a bong or
Uh, without

,... 12 -
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1

After he handed you a bong, what happened

Q

2
3

after that?
A

4

officer, Officer Vincello, arrived.

5

males exit the vehicle so I could conduct a search.

It was about that time, uh, another
I had the three

Q

Uh, during your search, what did you find?

A

I found, uh,--

6

in the trunk, I found a

7
8

larger--

9

I think it was over approximately forty-six grams.

a gallon size, uh, plastic bag with marijuana.
I

10

found, uhm, a bong mouth piece in the back seat, which

11

would go with a bong.

12

marijuana residue, a jar with marijuana residue, a, uh--

13

like a Ziploc bag box with a bunch more Ziploc bags that

14

had been, uh, used.

15

while I was searching, Mr. Hughes gave my partner,

16

Officer Vincello, a--

17

his pocket.

18
19
20
21

I found a pill bottle with

There was no residue in those.

a elec--

Uh,

a digital scale from

That's what was recovered.

Q

Have you been involved in any drug related

incidents in that parking lot before?
A

Yes.

Q

And how many in the last year?

A Approximately half a dozen within the last
22
23
24

year or so.

25

allegedly used?

Q

In those incidents, what was the drug

- 13 -

1

2
3

4

5

A

Marijuana.

Q

Did you qharge anyone?

A

Yes.

Q

Uhm, what.were the charges?

A

Possession of marijuana, possession of

6

paraphernalia and frequenting on--

7

people were, the different offenses.
In every offense, uhrn,--

Q

8

9

depending on who the

or in every

incident, were they inside or outside of the vehicle?
A

In.side.

Q

Every single one?

A

Yes.

13

Q

students?
How many people involved were

14

A

All of them, to my knowledge.

15

Q

in the dorms?
And how many were living

16

A

All of them, to my knowledge.

17

Q

Uh, what was the conclusion of-

10
11

12

18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

THE COURT:

Can--

can you tell me what the

relevance of that is?
MR. UGELSTAD:

Your--

Your Honor, to

establish that the parking lot is a place, uhm,-THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

No,--

It's a place?

MR. UGELSTAD:

Just that, uh, students use

- 14 -

1

that as a common place the students use to use

2

marijuana.
THE COURT:

3

Six incidents in the last year?

MR. UGELSTAD:

4

Uh, for, uh, Mr. Sieverding

alone.

5

THE WITNESS:

6

7

Just, uh--

yeah, me

specifically.

8

THE COURT:

9

Go ahead~

Oh, okay.

10
11
12
13
14

[MR. UGELSTAD CONTINUING]
After you searched the car, what was the

Q

conclusion of the, uhm, contact?
A

So, I--

I seized the--

the paraphernalia

15

and the marijuana.

And, uh, Mr. Hewes was cited.

He

16

was a minor at the time.

17

possession of marijuana and par--

18

Mr. Amstad was cited for frequenting and there was a

19

back seat passenger as well, Mr. Sharp.

20

for frequenting.

Uh, so he was cited for

21

MR. UGELSTAD:

22

No further questions.

23

THE COURT:

24

Ms. Hunter.

25

MS. HUNTER:

paraphernalia.

And

He was cited

Thank you ..

Thank you.

Uhm, yes.·
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CROSS EXAMINATION OF JOSEPH SIEVERDING

1
2
3

BY MS. HUNTER:
Uhm, so the parking lot is, uh,--

Q

4
5

the south side.

6

is the parking lot in relation to the Wallace Complex?
A

7
8

Sorry.

it says

Maybe you just tell me.

Where

It's just to the west, to the Wallace

Complex, across Stadium, uh, Street-

9

Q

Okay.

So--

10

A

-- or Stadium Avenue.

11

Q

So, it is a parking lot, uhm,--

uhm, for

12

the purpose of servicing the people in the West Wallace

13

Complex?
A

14
15

And there's soccer fields on the

other side of it.
Q

16
17

Correct.

Okay.

So both of those people would use

that parking lot?

18

A

Correct.

19

Q

People who live there and people who--

21

A

Um hmm.

22

Q

Uhm, and the West Wallace Complex is a

23

dorm, is that correct?

24

A

Yeah, yes.

25

Q

Okay.

20

okay.

Is that a dorm?

Is it a dorm?

I just learned that, so--

- 16-:--

uhm, so,

1

I think--

2

experience is that more than other complex, uh, or dorm

3

parking lots?

4

and six within the past year, and--

A

Yeah.

and your

Uhm, that one particularly, uh, is

5

one that it seems like a lot of my contacts for people

6

using drugs are in that specific parking lot.

7

Q

And, uhm, how many of an--

8

average were--

9

lots, or not complex, but dorm parking lots, like what's

10

are in other com--

how many on

a good average?

11

A

Uh, just a hand--

12

Q

Per year?

13

A

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

Or other lots.

16

Q

Okay.

17

That's all.

18

THE COURT:

19

Any redirect?

20

MR. UGELSTAD:

21

THE COURT:

22

like complex parking

two or three maybe--

for those other complexes, yeah.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Nothing, Your Honor.

Okay.

Thank you, Officer

Sieverding.

23

THE WITNESS:

Thank you.

24

THE COURT:

25

Any other witnesses?

Go ahead and have a seat there.

-
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MR. UGELSTAD:

1

THE COURT:

2

No, Your Honor.

Okay.

Thank you.

So the State

rests-

3

MR. UGELSTAD:

4

The State-

THE COURT:

5

6

its presentation of evidence

anyway?
MR. UGELSTAD:

7

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. HUNTER:

Yes, Your Honor.

Do you have witnesses to call?
Not at this time.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

Argument?

11

MR. UGELSTAD:

12

The statute, which can be read in the

Yes, Your Honor.

13

disjunctive, can read, it shall be unlawful for any

14

person to be present at any place where he knows illegal

15

controlled substances are being manufactured, etcetera.

16

Uh, this is a question about whether a stationary, non-

17

running car parked in a parking lot constitutes as a

18

place; it's not a question of whether it's premises.

19

There's no patrol--

20

THE COURT:

21

that the prem--

22

this, uh, analysis?

23
24
25

So--

so you're saying that--

the word premises doesn't even apply to

MR. UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

That--

yes, Your Honor.

But when--

this prepositional ph--

what do you make of

uh, phrase that. modifies
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1

premises?

It says premises of any place.
MR. UGELSTAD:

2

THE COURT:

3

It says-

That's--

that's--

that's what

4

you call, I think, in grammar, an adjectival

5

prepositional phrase.
MR. UGELSTAD:

6

It says, uh, to be present at--

7

present at or on--

8

you can either be present at a place or be on the

9

premises-

10
11
12
13
14
15

on premises of any place.

THE COURT:

Well, that'sof a place.

MR. UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

So, uhm,

That--

MR. UGELSTAD:

well, okay.

Well, that--

that's my

understanding, _butTHE COURT:

Alright.

I'm--

I'm just trying

16

to apply grammatical conventions to the way this statute

17

is written.

18

addressed in the ombudsman's report in terms of

19

analyzing the grammatical structure of the sentence,

20

which is a disaster, honestly.

21

supposed to read the statute the way it's written.

22
23

This--

this--

MR. UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

this issue was actually

But that--

we're

Right.

And apply the words as it--

in

24

terms of their common and ordinary meaning, unless they

25

are specifically defined.

So, I've been--

- 19 -

I looked at

1

this sentence all morning trying to-~

2

basically, diagram it, and I'm--

3

judge or lawyer or, I guess, ombudsman, who has tried to

4

decipher what this really means.

5

telling you where--

6

And I've--

7

opinion, obviously; I've read Judge Clark's opinion on

8

it; I've read the ombudsman's analysis; I've looked at

9

the statute; I've looked at other statutes, which direct

where--

I've read--

trying to,

I'm not the first, uh,

So, anyway, I'm just

where I've been on this.

I've read, uh, Judge Kershaw's

10

us in construing the language of statutes.

11

I--

12

in the same section and, uh, when--

13

uh, cases where children are present, thirty-~even -

14

twenty-seven thirty-seven A two, in which they

15

specifically define premises for that particular statute

16

as including motor vehicle, but they--

17

failed--

18

address the meaning of premises in this context.

19

Uhm, and I--

I also looked at, uhm, the other statute, which is
when it involves,

they--

they

the legislature failed to come back and

But you're saying--

that's why you're saying-

20

that's not why you're saying, but you're saying that-

21

that I don't even have to worry about premises.

22

MR. UGELSTAD:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. UGELSTAD:

25

THE COURT:

That's--

that's a-

I just need-Oh.

I just need to read it in the
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1

disjunction as, uh, unlawful for any person to be

2

present at any place or on any premises of any place.

3

MR. UGELSTAD:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. UGELSTAD:

That's our position.

Okay.
Uhm, and as far as the opinions

6

you referenced, the, uhm, two magistrate decisions and

7

ombudsman's report, uh, they were faced with

8

considerably different facts than we're faced with here.

9

Uhm, in those opinions, the car there was used for

10

travel.

In, uh, two of the opinions the car was parked,

11

the occupants left, and then the marijuana was spotted

12

in the vehicle.

13

v. Reid, it's not very clear, but it says that the

14

defendant acknowledges that there was marijuana in the

15

traveling vehicle.

16

that that was not parked and stationary.

17

Uhm, in those, also-

18

THE COURT:

Uh, in one of the opinions, uh, State

So, it, uhm--

And I--

I--

to--

to us, it seems

I didn't hear any--

19

am I to just assume that this was marijuana?

20

Officer Sieverding--

21

thought it was marijuana or it looked like marijuana,

22

but I didn't hear him verify it to be marijuana.

23

that something I should consider?

24

MR. UGELSTAD:

25

I mean,

Sieverding testified that he

Uhm, not at this--

Is

this issue,

Your Honor, would be a statutory interpretation issue.
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1

Uhm,-THE COURT:

2

Well, except we just have--

we

3

have a record now of--

4

support of this motion to dismiss and--

5

was no testing of the marijuana or verification that it

6

was marijuana; it could be some other leafy, green

7

substance.

8

it was marijuana.

training, he isTHE COURT:

12

MR. UGELSTAD:

13

THE COURT:

Okay.
Uhm,--

It could have been oregano?

Probably not, but go ahead.
MR. UGELSTAD:

15
16

we--

I

yeah, sorry.

Uhm, and, Your Honor, that, uh,

I'll continue.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. UGELSTAD:

19

THE COURT:

20

track.

21

testing your argument.

22

He thought

Yes, Your Honor, uhm, given his

11

14

and, uh, there

He just said it was marijuana.

MR. UGELSTAD:

9

10

of the evidence presented in

It's okay.
Uhm,--

I'm not trying to throw you off

Well, maybe a little, just test---

MR. UGELSTAD:

Uh, in those--

test--

also, in those

23

decisions, the--

the marijuana was just merely present.

24

Uhm, and, in fact, in two of those decisions, the

25

occupants weren't even in the vehicle at the time.
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1

There's no incidence--

there's no indication that it's

2.

going to be used, sold, uh, distributed, anything like

3

that.

4

the marijuana was on the driver's lap, the marijuana bag

5

was, uh, being hidden under the seat and there's a large

6

bong, uh, in the back seat.

Uhm, and then here we have the fogged windows,

7

Officer Sieverding also found over forty-six

8

grams of marijuana in the trunk, along with various

9

containers with marijuana residue and paraphernalia.

10

There was also a scaleTHE COURT:

11

There--

there's no evidence on

12

this record anyway, that Mr. Amstad knew what was in the

13

trunk.

14

MR. UGELSTAD:

I understand, Your Honor.

15

However, that, uhm--

16

Amstad's knowledge by the odor, how strong the odor was.

17

Uhm,--

18

THE COURT:

that evidence would go towards Mr.

Was it--

I didn't hear--

I

19

didn't hear Officer Sieverding talk about whether the

20

odor was raw marijuana or smoked--

21

MR. UGELSTAD:

22

He, uh,--

burnt marijuana.
I believe he said it

was not-

23

THE COURT:

Did he say-

24

MR. UGELSTAD:

25

THE COURT:

smoked at this time.

Okay.
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1

MR. UGELSTAD:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. UGELSTAD:

4

THE ·coURT:

5

MR. UGELSTAD:

I--

I--

I-

It was raw marijuana?
Yes, Your Honor.

Alright.
Uhm, in this case the--

6

Officer Sieverding asked the driver what they used to

7

smoke it with and, uh, the driver, Christopher Hughes,

8

handed him a--

the large glass bong in the back.

Uhm,-

9

10

THE COURT:

But what he smelled.

I'm talking

11

about what he smelled., what he said he smelled as he was

12

walking up to the car.

13

distinguishing, but I could be wrong.

I--

14

MR. UGELSTAD:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. UGELSTAD:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. UGELSTAD:

I--

I don't remember him

I--

I--

Do you remember?

I-

I don't.
I thought he was just-.

I might have missed it.
Okay.

Uhm, I'm not sure if--

19

if, uh,--

but it was unburned marijuana.

20

ombudsman report was worried about people being trapped.

21

They ever kind of quoted one of the defendants saying,

22

what am I supposed to do?

23.

the car as soon as I noticed that there's marijuana?

24

And I can see that's a real concern; however, none of

25

these facts, uhm, --

What--

Uhm, the

you know, jump out of

there was-
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1

THE COURT:

Well, what if it was?

Should that

2

be a concern in a statute like this?

3

along, somebody-- the driver pulls out a joint, what are

4

you supposed to do?

5

unless you get out of the car?

7

Are you immediately a criminal

MR. UGELSTAD:

6

Say you're driving

I'm not prepared to answer that

question, uhm--

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. UGELSTAD:

Okay.

at this time.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. UGELSTAD:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. UGELSTAD:

14

yeah, it's not the issue at hand.

15

Uhm, and--

That's fair enough.
And it's-

It doesn't apply to this case.
Yeah. It's just not the--

but going back to the original

16

concern, this statutory interpretation question, whether

17

a car can be a place.

18

interpretation is accepted, which is that a car can

19

never be a place that you can frequent, it would yield

20

absurd results.

21

especially students, especially college students in the

22

dorms to smoke in their cars and only have the

23

possibility of a possession charge and that's--

24

could be one person, as it was in this case, where the,

25

uhm,--

Uhm, if the defendant's

Uhm, it would incentivize everyone,

it

someone claims ownership of all of the
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1

paraphernalia and marijuana.

Uh, it would create just,

2

uh--

3

around a--

4

lot, uhm, they could be charged with frequenting.

5

However, now the fact that they're in a car, they're

6

shielded from this law, it--

7

sense.

hypothetically, if there were people sitting
a circle, passing a bong around in a parking

it just doesn't make

The, uhm,-THE COURT:

What it they're just in an open

8

9

field somewhere?
MR. UGELSTAD:

10

THE COURT:

11

It still would be-

Is that a--

MR. UGELSTAD:

12
13
14
15

16
17
18

THE COURT:

20

21
22

it's our position-

Is that a premises?

MR. UGELSTAD:

It's our position that would be

a premises or a place.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. UGLESTAD:

On--

on the premises or at--

or present at any place.
THE COURT:

19

I--

is that-

So, I mean, the State's position

qualifies under this statute.
is that anywhere you are
I wouldn't go that-MR. UGELSTAD:
how-- whereTHE COURT: How-- well,

23

MR. UGELSTAD:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. UGELSTAD:

far.

Where's the line?

What's-

the
On these facts, uhm, with
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-

1

car in a parked position, not--

2

running, that would qualify as a place.
THE COURT:

3

not moving, uh, not

A place in the car?

MR. UGELSTAD:

A place either in the car or on

4

5

the parking lot.

Uhm, I don't know if it has to-

THE COURT:

6

And the--

be distinguished.

MR. UGELSTAD:

7

THE COURT:

an~

Okay.

And the premises--

and,

8

9

again, premises has nothing to do with it?
MR. UGELSTAD:

10
11

Not in our position, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

12

Okay.

MR. UGELSTAD:

Defendant's interpretation

13
14

would also, uh, be absurd because it would make all R-

15

Vs, uh, mobile homes and trailers immune from the

16

statute.

17

anything of this sort of a vehicle.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

That would be including mobile meth labs,

Uhm, and lastly, as Your Honor's aware, that
you have ruled on this issue on a similar set of facts.
THE COURT:

What if I was wrong?

MR. UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

at-

It's-

MR, UGELSTAD:
THE COURT:

Uh,--

At the moment,--

And it's happened.

MR. UGELSTAD:

At the moment, it's--

it's,
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1

uh, local con--

local authority.

2

THE COURT:

Local precedent?

3

MR. UGELSTAD:

Yeah.

Uhm, and in that set of

4

facts, that there was a-- a car parked in a lot on

5

Seventh and Elm as designated at lot--

6

six, uh, same situation, it was parked, not moving,

7

officer walked up.

8

read in the disfunc--

9

the, uh,--

as lot sixty-

Uhm, you stated that it could be
disjunctive and it can be--

the car was a place.

Or the--

and

it was, uh--

10

they were present at a place.

For these reasons, Your

11

Honor, the State requests this Court deny the

12

defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR, UGELSTAD:

15

THE COURT:

16

Ms. Hunter.

17

MS. HUNTER:

Alright.
Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Ugelstad.

Uhm, so if I'm understanding the

18

State's position correctly, you're not worried about the

19

premises of any place, just a--

20

at--

21

be present at any place, is what he's arguing.

22
23
24
25

just, uhm, be present

and we can cut out or on the premises of.

THE COURT:
MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:
eliminate--

So just
Right?

That's what I understand.
Is that correct?
We're just--

Okay.

we're just

we're just whiting out on-

- 28 -

000.106

-·
1

MS. HUNTER:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. HUNTER:

On the premises of.
Yeah.

THE COURT:

4

Okay.
we're
That present at anyplace,

of any place.
whiting out, or on premises

5

MS. HUNTER:

6

THE COURT:

Okay.
Well, no, no, we're not.

Let me

7

see this.

8

Yeah.
MS. HUNTER:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.
On premises.of--

on premises of.

10
MS. HUNTER:

Okay.

Uhm, so, uh, forgive me.

11

12

I--

13

this motion with, uhm, these memos and orders attached

14

because they did a--

15

being eloquent in describing this kind of-

16

17

I might read some of this because I--

THE COURT:
MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:

I--

I filed

a much better job than I could at

Well, I wouldn't--- unnecessarily complexI wouldn't necessarily concede

18
19

that, but I--

I have read all those.

MS. HUNTER:

Yes.

And, so, it does--

it does

20
21

discuss the specific definition of place, how it's, uh,

22

defined in several dictionaries, and I think he cites

23

Black's Law Dictionary, uhm, and, uh, says the court

24

notes the terminology in the statute supports the

25

argument that the legislator intended a particular
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1

geographic location when using these terms.·

Uhm, and

2

then he--

3

include moveable mobile--

4

presumably the words in or near would have been used.

5

One is at a house or on land, one is not in or near a

6

car.

7

kind of the main focus of my argument, is language of

8

the statute, uhm, if--

9

include a car, they should have included a car.

it says if the legislator had meant to

And that's, uhm,--

moveable motor vehicles.,

and, you know,--

and.that's

and if the legislators wanted to
Like

10

you stated, there's another, uhm, statute where they

11

talked about the premises and place and included, uhm,--

12

and--

13

Uhm, and they didn't do that in this one.

14

an incredibly broad statute.

15

to help make it even broader, uhm, and include words

16

that aren't in there, uhm, especially when considering

17

the-

18

and made--

and included, uh, a vehicle in that.

THE COURT:

Uhm, I don't think we need

I don't think--

19

they're talking about including words.

20

about eliminating words.

21

MS. HUNTER:

22

THE COURT:

23

Uhm, this is

I don't think
They're talking

What do you mean?
In--

in--

so to make it in the

disjunctive, it's either a place or it's a premises of-

24

MS. HUNTER:

25

THE COURT:

Of a place.
a--

a place.
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1

MS. HUNTER:

2

THE COURT:

Sure.
So, honestly--

I mean, I do think

3

this is a--

this is kind of a question of, uh,--

4

a--

5

uh, a question of grammatical structure-

it's

it's a question of definition and it's a divi--

6

MS. HUNTER:

7

THE COURT:

Sure.
as much as a legal analysis.

8

That's why I'm way unqualified to really sort this out,

9

I think.

But, uh, it's really an interesting question

10

and, you know, I think this is one more example why, as

11

people say, you shouldn't watch, uh, laws or sausages

12

being made, because this--

13

this--

14

history.

15

actually tried to find some and there was no, uhm--

16

could only go back so far in Westlaw--

I don't-And I--

the--

the--

the--

the way

there isn't much, uh, legislative
I started by saying that because I

17

MS. HUNTER:

18

THE COURT:

19

And I--

you

Um hmm.
on legislative history.

maybe you two tried to do that,· and

20

thinking, oh, there's going to be some discussion about

21

this.

22

that--

23

any information that--

24

legislative website.

25

And apparently, there wasn't because-that's why I just ask-that--

I mean,

I just asked, is there
I looked on the

I'm just telling you this to know-

to let you know where kind of I went and-
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1

MS. HUNTER:

2

THE COURT:

3

works in the legis--

4

have--

5

direction?

6

you know.

7

statute was first--

8

she really didn't find anything.

9

uhm, it was first written in nineteen seventy-one, but

is there--

And I asked one of the people who
legislative--

I said; do you

can you point me in the right

And I-What--

Sure.

I'm just going to tell you this so
what she said is that the--

the

so this is just a summary, which
But she said that,

10

paragraph D was not added until nineteen seventy-two.

11

And that's when it said knowingly frequent places where

12

illegal, uh, was added.

13

changed to be present at or on the premises of any

14

place.

15

legislature-

16

17
18

And in seventy-seven, it

And that was because they--

MS. HUNTER:

they--

the

Didn't have to prove more than

one.
THE COURT:

wanted to make--

make--

19

impose criminal liability on a single incident, instead

20

of the problem with, uh, proving this course of conduct,

21

frequenting, whatever that meant.

22

MS. HUNTER:

23

THE COURT:

Sure.
And, uhm, they didn't have any

24

discussion.

She said she checked the statement of

25

purpose and there was no discussion on the use of the
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1

term premises or the concept, other than to refer to,

2

quote, the scene of the crime.

3

referencing the--

4

course, legislative history can only be referred to

5

unless--

6

language is ambiguous.

7

we'll get to that.

8

this to find ambiguity and there's another way to look

9

at it to not find ambiguity;

Now, I--

I--

I'm

the legislative history and, of

if you find first that the statute or the
Uhm, and, you know, r-~

we'll--

I mean, there's one way to look at

But the problem with

10

legislative history, as Bart--

11

say is that nobody voted on the legislative history.

12

The legislative history is really not law.

13

provide some guidance?

14

I mean, you kind of look to a legislative history as a--

15

as a last resort to try to determine legislative intent.

16

But the best evidence of legislative intent is--

17

use of their language, because that is the law, that's

18

what was passed.

19

the--

20

part~- this phrase of the place and the premises was not

21

really part of the discussion of the statute.

22

wanted to, uh, eliminate the requirement that they had--

23

that they prove this kind of continuous contact, but I-

24
25

I heard Bart Davis once

Can it

Well, the case law says--

So, uhm,--

so, yeah, that's--

the frustrating part of this, is this--

I-- I

would say, it's--

yeah,

is the

that's
this

They just

it's fair to say that they

were thinking about places where people would hold
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1

things, uh, I mean, structures, I'm thinking like a drug

2

house kind of thing.

3

overall discussion historically was about drug

4

conspiracies and they wanted to bring more people in.

5

So thit's just sort of the general history.

6

know that it has that much relevance to where we are

7

today, trying to interpret this.

8

interrupting.
MS. HUNTER:

9

10

Because part--

part of the--

the

But I don't

So, anyway, sorry for

No, you're fine.

Uhm, I

appreciate your insight.

11

THE COURT:

And some of this comes out of the

12

ombudsman's report and, also, uhm, Judge Clark's, uh,

13

report because they both talk about the legislative .

14

history.

15

MS. HUNTER:

16

Uhm, and kind of, uhm, continuing on with

Yes, they do.

It's interesting.

17

that, uh, how we should interpret, uhm, statutes, uhm,

18

and what's relevant, uh, you know, legislative history

19

or not.

20

State v. Martinez, uhm, uh, phra--

21

ambiguous criminal statutes must be strictly construed

22

in favor of the accused, so I just want to throw that

23

out there as well.

Uhm, I just want to point out that, uh, the

24
25

Uhm, so I-said, it--

it--

phrase that says the

so, I mean, like I--

and you've read the--

like I

my Motion to
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1

Dismiss, so you've read all of the, uhm,--

all of the

2

reasoning, so I won't go into the nuts and bolts of that

3

other than to say, uhm, you know, the--

4

legislator[sic] would have included it, uhm--

5

if they wanted to.

the
a vehicle

They knew how to do that.

Uhm, and I want to address some of the State's

6

7

arguments.

They argue that the car, uhm, is not used

8

for traveling.

9

enough evidence to conclude that.

Uhm, and I don't think that there is
Uhm, Officer

10

Sieverding said that he couldn't remember whether or not

11

the car was running.

12

remember if it was running or not, which means their

13

argument that, well, you know, the other cases, uhm,--

14

you know, the car was running and then it wasn't, so

15

it's still travel because they were traveling before.

16

Uhm, I don't think that that really matters, uhm,

17

because we--

18

on the evidence, we don't know when the car last, uhm,

19

ran, but, uhm, uh,--

20

thought.

21

So it was parked but he couldn't

we don't know when the car--

well, based

I'm sorry, I lost my train of

And, also, I--

I--

and I don't remember if

22

he addressed this in his oral argument, but he--

I

23

think he references it in--

24

references it in the response that he filed, uhm, that

25

the car is one that's known to be something that stores

I believe he reference--
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1

marijuana in it.

Let me make sure that's accurate.

2

Uhm, let's see here.

3

case he did and I'm missing it, uhm, there would be--

4

if this were to go to trial, there would be evidence.

5

And that's the problem, is there would be evidence, uhm,

6

to the--

7

this was a place that had marijuana in it, uhm,

8

regularly.

Well, maybe he doesn't, but in

to the fact that my client did not know that

9

And I also wanted to address the fact that the

10

car, uhm, was in a parking lot where, you know, there'd

11

been--

12

Uhm, this is a parking lot that's att--

13

used for, uhm, students who live in the west com--

14

complex dorm and the West Wallace dorm--

15

is a dorm, and, uh, my client lives in that-

16

You live in that, right?

17

he--

there'd been a lot of stops for marijuana.

complex, which

You don't live in

that one?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

MS. HUNTER:

20

Well, we would establish-

21

THE COURT:

Humpt um.

Okay.

Never mind.

MS. HUNTER:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

that's, uhm,

MS. HUNTER:
uh,--

why he was there.
I--

yeah.

But it's a dorm.

Uh, it's not,

people have to use that parking lot.

Uhm, it's
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1

not its only function.

2

So, uhm, I also want to address the trapped

3

issue.

4

point that it didn't, uh, apply to the facts here.

5

Again, were this to go to trial, there's evidence to the

6

contrary that there, uhm,--

7

Uhm, I don't think there's enough evidence to, uh--

8

don't know that there's enough evidence to conclude that

9

it doesn't.

10

Uhm, the State acknowledged that it wa~ a good

that it would apply here.
I

Uhm, and then he talks about absurdity and if

11

this were--

12

in the way that, uhm,--

13

would be an absurd result.

14

other counties have it--

15

with the, uhm, decisions in, I think it was Twin Falls

16

and Bonneville County and, uh, which--

17

other county was, uhm, I don't think it--

18

reasonable to say that it's not absurd if two other,

19

uhm, judges just in our State, at least, have

20

interpreted it that way.

21
22

the statute were to con--

THE COURT:
mean, this--

to be construed

that I ask it to be, then it
Uhm, first of all, I think
I mean, is it--

as I've shown

whichever the
I think it's

Uhm,--

It's kind of interesting that--

I

this has been going on for so long, that--

23

MS. HUNTER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. HUNTER:

Yeah.
nobody took it up.
Yeah.
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MR. UGELSTAD:

1

I don't know.

That is interesting.

MS. HUNTER:

2

Yeah.

I've

thought that, too.

3

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. HUNTER:

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. HUNTER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. TOMLIN:

10

that.

Ms. Tomlin,-Like why-you--

has this not been decided.
Go ahead.
Well, I have some insight on

I can wait 'til it's a more appropriate timeTHE COURT:

11

what--

what--

Insight for-

MS. TOMLIN:

for me to address the Court.

THE COURT:

an--

12
is--

are you:---

are

13
14

you going to tell me there's an appellate decision on

15

this?

16

MS. TOMLIN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. TOMLIN:

19

THE COURT:
MS. TOMLIN:

Uhm, not at all.
No.

Okay.

But it has been someGo ahead.
Uhm, it--

it is something that

20
21

has come up from my perspective, and so I can share

22

those insights and--

23

were dealt with and why this case is now in front of you

24

here in this court again and--

25

to address it.

as to why, uhm--

how those cases

and you're being asked

I can talk about this.

This isn't a new
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1

issue to the city at all.

2

THE COURT:

Well, it's not a new issue to--

3

obviously, because of these other decisions.

4

new issue since this statute was passed.

5

MS. TOMLIN:

And,--

absolutely.

It's not a

So, uh,

6

there's been opportunities in the pretrial room for

7

negotiation based on these reports and this question was

8

raisedTHE COURT:

9

10

development of a law.

11

MS. TOMLIN:

12

THE COURT:

Well, but I'm talking about the

I understand that.
Yeah.

I mean, the legislature

13

hasn't addressed it and the Supreme Court or the Court

14

of Appeals hasn't addressed it and I'm not aware of a

15

district court that has addressed it, unless you all

16

tell me otherwise, which if that--

17

that's surprising to me--

18

MS. TOMLIN:

19

THE COURT:

I agree.
that this statute hasn't been

20

addressed and--

21

worth it, given the level of the charge, for people to

22

do that.

23

you know, a public defender's office would have, you

24

know, said, you know what, let's--

All--

and--

all I'm saying is

and my guess is that it's not

but I would--

would have thought a--

let's just find out-

25
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1

MS. TOMLIN:

2

THE COURT:

3

Sure.
what the--

Court thinks about it.

So, anyway.

MS. TOMLIN:

4

I'm just--

MS. TOMLIN:

6

8

now for a while.

9

points out.

Not the first time, as Mr. Ugelstad

Right.

THE COURT:

11

12

I mean, I've thought about this

MS. HUNTER:

10

I curious about it.

I wondered the same thing.

THE COURT:

7

That's-

No, I won-

THE COURT:

5

what the Supreme

Uhm, so-

I love having an old decision that

I made seven years ago, likeMS. HUNTER:

13

So you can see how you-

THE COURT:

14

presented to me in the way that

15

I'm bound by my own precedent, which is very good to do

16

that.

17

mean, I actually--

18

looked at the case, but that was in two thousand ten.

But I--

I--

I had to go back.

I--

yeah.

I

I kind of remembered it, once I

Yeah.

I wasn't aware of that-

19

MS. HUNTER:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. HUNTER:

until-'

22

THE COURT:

happened-

23

MS. HUNTER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. HUNTER:

A lot's-

this morning.
since two thousand ten.
So, I wish I would have-
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1

THE COURT:

Yeah.

2

MS. HUNTER:

been able to see that.

But,

3

uh, so I can't really distinguish it from this case

4

because I haven't seen it.

5

don't think it would be an absurd, uhm, result is just

6

because he--

7

be subject to, uhm, the subsection D, uhm, in this

8

statute but you'd be subject to every other--

9

subject to the possession aspect and all of the--

But, uhm, the other reason I

that, you know, they--

uh, you wouldn't

you'd be
you

10

know, there's several, uhm, uh, sections that still

11

apply.

12

have to work a little harder to prove it, to prove that

13

there had been something bad going on, but I don't think

14

it's absurd.

15

And you could, uhm--

and, you know, you might

Uhm, also, they brought up the, uhm,--

the

16

point that they--

that they believed that mobile homes

17

and trailers and R-Vs would be, uhm, now not subject to

18

this, uhm,--

19

statute, which I don't agree with.

20

and trailers, uhm, if they're attached to land, are

21

regularly, uhm, interpreted to not be a vehicle, even-

22

and I--

23

through and look--

24

the places that it would--

25

but I did--

to this statute--

and I--

and I can't--

to this section of the

I--

Uhm, mobile homes

I didn't go

and look at all the statute--

all

it does, uhm, indicate that,

I'm familiar with the homestead exemption
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1

because I've done some bankruptcies and you--

2

section--

3

one subsection two, if you're interested, but, uhm, it

4

does--

5

attached to the land yet.

6

think that you would have to strictly interpret a mobile

7

home and a trailer to be a vehicle.

8

that's true.

9

tactic to bring up a mobile meth lab.
uhm,--

11

lab down.

I--

I don't

I don't think that

And I think that's a little bit of a scare
I think that,

Uhm,-THE COURT:

Yeah.

I don't--

I don't think

anybody running a mobile meth lab would be charged withwith a-

15

MS. HUNTER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. HUNTER:

18

So, uhm, I--

that there would be a way to bring a mobile meth

12

14

Idaho Code section fifty-five - one thousand

you can exempt a mobile home, even if it's not

10

13

and it's

Frequenting.
frequenting as the charge.
I would think that they would

have bigger fish to fry.

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. HUNTER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. HUNTER:

Probably.
But, uhm,-One could speculate.
Yes.

Uhm, so,--

and he also--

23

I don't think he brought it up in his oral argument, but

24

in his motion, he talks about how this would drive kids

25

to smoke in cars now, uhm, and how that would be really
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1

bad for the public.

I think that, uhm, maybe kids would

2

smoke in cars more, but I would think that would be--

3

make it easier for the cops to find them than if

4

they're, uhm, found--

5

their room or wherever else they do it.

6

understand why they don't go to Pullman, but, uh,--

7

anyway, soTHE COURT:

8

9

found in other remote location or
Uhm, so I don't
but

Well, then they'd have to drive

back stoned.
MS. HUNTER:

10

THE COURT:

Right.

That's true.

That's the other--

that's the

11
12

ot0er, uh, demon that Mr. Ugelstad raises, is that we'd

13

be encouraging, uh, students to get high and drive under

14

the influence.

15

MS. HUNTER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. HUNTER:

18

THE CORUT:

19

MS. HUNTER:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. HUNTER:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. HUNTER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. HUNTER:

Are uhYou don't have to respond to that.
No, no, no.
I'm just saying,-I--

I-

That's one of the thingsI've gotThat's one of theNo, IOne of theand II thought about that, too,

-
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-

and that's what made me think of the Washington

2

thing, because I'm like, well, they drive to Washington

3

to get--

4

if we're trying to de-incentivize that or prevent that,

5

then, you know,--

to get high and drive home, so, uhm, you know,

THE COURT:

6

7

Maybe we could charge people with

driving under the influence.
MS. HUNTER:

8

9

I don't-

Right.

There--

that's another

statute that-

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. HUNTER:

There's that.
you could use.

12

anyway, uh, I--

13

response to his--

14

you said, it's an interesting issue that's uh--

15

uhm,--_

16

been, uhm,--

17

uhm,--

18

now and figure out what we want to do with it for now.

19

Uhm, and I would ask that you, uh, grant my motion to

20

dismiss.

and I--

I guess that's my--

Uhm, so,

to his arguments.

the last of my
And, so, uhm, like
that's,

and I was surprised that it hadn't

that it hadn't been appealed either.

but I think that it's--

Okay.

But,

it's good to address it

21

THE COURT:

Thank you.

22

Do you want to respond to anything?

23

MR. UGELSTAD:

Just two things, Your Honor.

24

Uhm, a lot of the points that defense counsel has

25

brought up is, uhm--

and--

and she even said, are
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1

issues for trial and--

2

weight in this statutory interpretation argument.

3

also the other counties that were presented, or that

4

have ruled on this issue, were not presented with these

5

facts.

6

was parked and not moving, uhm, running or not running,

7

it's still not moving.

8

very different facts from the other counties.

9

and not to be, uhm,--

have any
Uhm,

Uhm, these are very specific facts where the car

It's parked and stationary and

And that's it, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. TOMLIN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. TOMLIN:

Alright.

Thank you.

Your Honor.
Yes.
If I may just add a little bit of

14

history from the city's perspective that, uhm, would

15

assist in what Mr. Ugelstad argued.

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. TOMLIN:

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. TOMLIN:

Okay.
May I do that?
Sure.
Thank you.

Uhm, in the past,

20

there have been some frequenting cases that, uhm, did,

21

uh,--

22

pretrial room, I was faced with these same, uhm,

23

pleadings and trial court rulings and ombudsman reports

24

and I did consider those and, uhm, ultimately, I

25

dismissed those because I-

were charged with a moving vehicle and, in the

-
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1

THE COURT :

2

MS. TOMLIN:

Yeah.
-- I agreed that the vehicle was

3

moving and I couldn't identify it as a place.

4

wanted this Court to know that this is one of, uh,--

5

well, it's the first case I've had with frequenting

6

whereTHE COURT:

7

8

another--

9

THE COURT:

11

statute forever.

12

it?

13

I wish we could come up with

because it's not a frequenting statute.
MS. TOMLIN:

10

And so I

It--

you're right.

It hasn't been a frequenting

I don't know what--

MS. TOMLIN:

And-

what do we call

I have to retrain my brain, but I

14

understand that it's not frequenting.

15

place where drugs were used, stored, manufactured; I

16

think it gets wordy to say.

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. TOMLIN:

19

So, being in a

Yeah.
So, we need a better catch

phrase.

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. TOMLIN:

Yeah.
But, uh, regardless of, uhm,

22

whether we're calling a rose by another name or not, I

23

do think that, uh, when this issue was presented to the

24

city by Ms. Hunter and, uhm, Mr. Amstad, uhm, I reread

25

these and then I reread the facts and I understand that
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1

Mr. Ugelstad took the reins on this and did a lot of

2

research, and so 'he's in the weeds where I'm--

3

and--

4

answer some of the questions, but the distinguishing

5

points for me in terms of not dismissing this as quickly

6

as I had dismissed the others, where the vehicle was in

7

motion.

8

statutory interpretation presented by Ms. Hunter, I

9

really could not get past a couple details, and those

I'm not

and so, uh, he might be in a better position to

Based on the persuasiveness of the, uhm,

10

were that, uhm, the vehicle was stationery and that it

11

was in a lot.

12

something else that maybe would be a canopy of sorts for

13

people who are trying to hide and maybe get away from an

14

R-A or someone else who does the mandatory reporting.

15

That's where my mind went.

16

now what would this be?

17

Elms on campus.

18

students might feel a little bit more insulated in terms

19

of hiding to, uhrn--

20

the facts and I knew that they were stationary and I

21

knew that they were in this parking lot and that Officer

22

Sieverding, uhm,--

23

only speak to the incidences that he has, uhm, dealt

24

with in that parking lot, but--

25

that he's even assigned to campus patrol because he

And I tried to analogize the vehicle to

And so, I was like where--

So I thought of the camper down

I thought of a couple other places that

to smoke pot.

And when I, uh, read

and only Officer Sieverding--

and--

I can

and the times
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1

didn't testify to that so I don't want to put words in

2

his mouth or let this Court, uhm, hear something that I

3

can't be sure of, but it's not all the time.

4

within this timeframe, it's only, uhm, you know, six or

5

seven, but I think that that's somewhat significant

6

because he knows it's a place or premises, which is, uh,

7

buildings or land or appurtenances attached to

8

something, right?

That's a premises?

THE COURT:

9

10
11

MS. TOMLIN:

That's the definition of

THE COURT:

That's what I'm going to-

THE COURT:

14

17

I don't know what a premises is.

MS. TOMLON:

13

16

So,--

premises.

12

15

And, so,

Yes.
That's what I'm going to try and

divine.
MS. TOMLIN:
premise is, uhm,--

Yeah.

A premises, uh,--

a

or premises is-

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. TOMLIN:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. HUNTER:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. HUNTER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. TOMLIN:

'Well, Mr.What isUgelstad is sayingA premises is-premises has-Premises isnothing to do with this.
I
I understand he said that, but
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1

did contemplate it.
THE COURT:

2

Okay.

MS. TOMLIN:

3

And I'm not saying that he's

4

wrong, but I did contemplate it because it's part of--

5

it's part of what helps me understand what a place is.

6

And, so, when I'm reading that in the language of the

7

statute, uhm, I think thatTHE COURT:

8

Okay.

MS. TOMLIN:

9

10

a parking lot is a place.

And I think that, uh, any kind of shelterTHE COURT:

11
12

That's the--

Is a parking lot a premises?

that's part of the question.
Absolutely.

13

MS. TOMLIN:

14

THE COURT:

15
16

MS. TOMLIN:

uhm, it says in the definition of 'premises, that it's,

17

uhm, _:....
THE COURT:

18
19

22
23

24
25

It is attached to the dorm.

I don't know.

And,

Where's the

definition of premises?
MS. TOMLIN:

20
21

Okay.

Well, I'll--

I'll go get it for

you.
THE COURT:
MS. TOMLIN:
THE COURT:

No.

I'm not going to-

Okay.
I'm not going to let you guys

double up like this.
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1

MS. TOMLIN:

Yeah.

2

THE COURT:.

I mean-

3

MS. TOMLIN:

4

THE COURT:

I don't want to double up.
I'-m getting a totally different

argument now, from you.

5

MS. TOMLIN:

6

Well, I agree with his argument

7

in many respects, but I'm telling you where I came to in

8

terms of not dismissing it outright and handing the

9

reins to him, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. TOMLIN:

Right.
And the other thing--

12

talk about that anymore, because I understand.

13

not what I'm trying to do.

14

the--

15

on.
THE COURT:

16

That's

But let me tell you the--

the last fact that I lingered

Okay.

MS. TOMLIN:

17
18

the fact t_hat--

I won't

And that was, uhm, that the

windows were fogged up.

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. TOMLIN:

Yeah.
And I--

I stayed on that for a

21

while.

And the reason I did is because it indicated

22

that there was time.

23

and I like his response, because he said he didn't have

24

to answer that question or wasn't prepared to in terms

25

of, you know, when does it become a crime for someone to

You asked Mr. Ugelstad earlier,
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be--

let's say they're in a moving car and someone

2

lights up a joint, at what point do they, you know, get

3

to say, let me out, I don't want to be implicated or,

4

you knowTHE COURT:

5

So because the windows are foggy,

6

it means they've been in the car for a long time smoking

7

marijuana?

8
9

I am not jumping that fa,r with

MS. TOMLIN:
it, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. TOMLIN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. TOMLIN:

Okay.
But what I am sayingwhat are you-

What--

is that it indicates a period

14

of time, uhm, in which, uh, there was some knowledge.

15

And so then the next-

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23

THE COURT:

It.depends on how cold it was, who

was in there, what was going on in there.
MS. TOMLIN:
THE COURT:

I understand that.
I mean, it--

it could be so many

different things.
MS. HUNTER:

Your Honor, I'm--

MS. TOMLIN:

So, then the next thing, Your

Honor, is that the, uhm,--

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. TOMLIN:

oh, sorry.'

this-

How cold it was.
The-
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THE COURT:

1

I mean, I--

I don't know.

I don't know.

I

2

mean, I--

3

don't have a clear record, even, of whether it--

4.

whether it was raw marijuana that was smelled or burning

5

mari--

I

marijuana.

6

MS. TOMLIN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. TOMLIN:

9

THE COURT:

10

I mean, and I don't even--

MS. TOMLIN:

I underOr burnt marijuana.
I understand.
Or marijuana smoke.
I understand that wasn't in the

11

record.

12

because past cases were dismissed when I felt like

13

there--

14

compelling and I'm trying to just help you understand

15

what--

16

the city understands those discrepancies and that there

17

was a--

18

those.

19

I'm just letting you know where I came to,

that what you've been presented with was

that--

that I understand the discrepancies and

a place here, uhm, that, I think, went past
And, then, I'm not going to-THE COURT:

And that--

and that--

and that

20

your line was the fact that the car was stationary in

21

the parking lot?

22

MS. TOMLIN:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

That was critical to me.
That made a difference in your

analysis of whether or not you should pursue the case?
MS. TOMLIN:

It did.

And then, uhm, Mr.
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1

Amstad sitting in--

if he had been sitting in the back

2

seat, that would be really significant to me in terms

3

of--

4

we'd be.

we probably would have--

Mr. Sieve--

MS. TOMLIN:

6

THE COURT:

7

8

I don't know where

But he was sitting rightTHE COURT:

5

I--

next toOfficer Sieverding says that's

where they grabbed the bong.
MS. TOMLIN:

9

10

uhm, on the lap of the driver.
THE COURT:

11
12

MS. TOMLIN:

THE COURT:

I understand that that's what

It was not confirmed to be

marijuana, according to the officer's testimony.
MS. TOMLIN:

17
18

there was--

was-

15
16

I mean, there was--

there was presumed marijuana on the lap of the driver.

13
14

Well, there was raw marijuana,

indicated.

I understand what the record

I just wanted to let you know-

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. TOMLIN:

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. HUNTER:

23

THE COURT:

Yeah.
my thoughts.
Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Your Honor, can II mean, I can't--

I can't analyze

24

a case based on, well, we didn't prosecute all these

25

cases, so that means we should prosecute this case.
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1

MS. HUNTER:

2

THE COURT:

3·

MS. TOMLIN:

4

THE COURT:

5

line is, but that's--

6

figure out here.

Uhm, Your Honorthat.
I know you're not saying
Okay.
You're saying, this is where the
I mean, that's what I have to

Did you want to say something else, Ms.

7

Hunter?

8

MS. HUNTER:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

else?

I'm sorry?
Did you want to say something

Is thatMS. HUNTER:

Yeah, I did, Your Honor.

Because

12
13

I feel like this is hinging on facts and I feel like I

14

should be able to offer facts, if they're going to base

15

it on facts that, honestly, aren't the case.
THE COURT:

16
17

I'm not going to consider anything

that's not part of the record.
MS. HUNTER:

18

THE COURT:

19

Okay.
And the only thing that's part of

20

the record is what Officer Sieverding test--

21

to.

22
23

MS. HUNTER:

Right.

Well, I--

testified

would you, uh-

would you be okay with me putting my client on to

24

establish other facts?

Because this isn't--

25

find it interesting that Ms. Tomlin-

and I--

I
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THE COURT:

1

Well, if the-said-

MS. HUNTER:

2

the other facts--

THE COURT:

3

if-

and you--

4

you alluded to this, which isn't part of the record,

5

that--

6

issue, whether or not he knew, and that--

7

legitimate question.

8

to kind of put everybody at ease, in terms of this

9

Motion to Dismiss, I think--

that at trial, it--

I--

it--

this would be an

I would--

that's a

I would say, just

I think I really have to

10

construe the facts that are established, that are in the

11

record, in a light most favorable to the State.

12

question of whether he knew or didn't know would beSure.

13

MS. HUNTER:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. HUNTER:

I wasn't going to-

16

THE COURT:

I'm talking about--

17

MS. HUNTER:,

18
19

THE COURT:
based upon the--

THE COURT:

21
22

a jury question anyway.

ask him.
analysis
I'm talking about a legal

the record now that I have before me.

MS. HUNTER:

20

So that

Sure.
About the application of this

statute.
MS. HUNTER:

23

But, uhm, I--

Sure.

I--

I get that, Your

24

Honor.

and I wasn't going to go into

25

whether or not he knew, because I know that that's a--
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1

that's a factual issue.

But whether or not the car was

2

moving and was a mode of transportation--

3

tell you what he would say, and if you want to cons--

4

if you want him to put it on the record so you want to

5

consider it, we can do that.

6

going--

7

Uhm, they were trying to decide what to do next.

They--

8

and they were going to go to Walmart.

and--

9

and if you don't want to consider that, it's not a very-

going to Walmart.

THE COURT:

10

I--

MS. HUNTER:

11

and I can

They were planning on
They were on their way.

Also, I--

I don't-

That--

that's fine.

Yeah, your--

Your Honor,--

12

MR. UGELSTAD:

13

MS. HUNTER:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. UGELSTAD:

16

MS. HUNTER:

17

THE COURT:

the record right now.

18

MR. UGELSTAD:

That's not part of the record.

19

MS. HUNTER:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. HUNTER:

22

want it to be part--

23

him on-

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. HUNTER:

But I would at least likeWell, it's not part ofThat's notto say.

That's fine.
Yeah.
And if--

and--

and if you don't

if you don't want it--

me to put

Uh, it's not whatit's just [REMAINDER OF
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1

STATEMENT UNINTELLIGIBLE, COURT SPEAKING AT THE SAME

2

TIME.]

3

THE COURT:

4

-- I want or don't want, it's just

what is-

5

MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:

6

-- right now.

7

MS .. HUNTER:

8

THE COURT:

9

Okay.
And--

and I-

Well, then II can tell--

I can tell you like

whatever the intentions were of the people in the car

10

about the mobility of the car, I don't think it's

11

particularly relevant to the--

12

MS. HUNTER:

Okay.

to the legal analysis.
Well, then I'd at least

13

like to point out that it wasn't established that the

14

car was-

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. HUNTER:

17

THE COURT:

19

MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:

20

MS. HUNTER:

23

THE COURT:

25

Uhm, and I'd

And I--

I agree.

And I'd alsoIt was not established one way or

the other.

22

24

not running.

also like-

18

21

Yeah.

MS. HUNTER:
point out that--

Right.

And--

The car may have been running.
Yes.

And I'd also like to, uh,

well, because the, uhm, State said

-
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1

that it was a lot different from, uhm,--

2

other cases, because it wasn't'moving.

3

other cars weren't moving either.

4

uhm, possibly, and, uh,--

5

THE COURT:

Well, I--

from these
Uhm, and the

They had been moving,

I do think that--

I

6

can't remember which case it was, the guys were in the

7

alley and one guy was charged just because he said-~

8

even though he wasn't in the car, that--

9

parked car in a parking lot.

10

MS. HUNTER:

11

THE COURT:

12

marijuana in the car.

13

MS. HUNTER:

14

THE COURT:

15

it was--

16

Clark's case.

17
but I--

19

could-

Um hmm.
And he said, I--

I knew there was

Sure.
I can't--

it's one or the other--

it was either Judge Kershaw's case or Judge

MS. HUNTER:

18

and it was a

I--

Yeah.

I'm not good with names,

so I don't remember which is which, but I

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. HUNTER:

Yeah.
tell you which, uh,

22

circumstances it went with.

So, anyway, uh, so that's

23

my rebuttal to that.

24

or, well, I guess I won't address that because you

25

already kind of did.

And in terms of, uhm,--

of the--

So, yeah, that's all I want to
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1

say.

Thank you.

2

THE COURT:

Alright.

Thank you.

3

Well, I mean, there's a lot of kind of

4

surrounding facts that we could all argue about.

5

of those--

6

resolved at trial, as I just said.

7

of the Motion to Dismiss, filed by the defense, that I

8

have to--

9

in a light most favorable to the State on any kind of

a lot of those would--

A lot

would have to be
I think for purposes

I have to really construe the facts in a--

10

motion to, uh--

11

of these questions, uhm, are for a jury or these--

12

well, these questions.

13

with for purposes of making t~is decision is the fact--

14

facts that, uh, we're on the University of Idaho campus

15

in a parking lot that's associated with Wallace Complex,

16

but also has other purposes, like servicing the soccer

17

field, uh, that Officer Sieverding sees fogged windows,

18

attracts his attention.

19

I'd have--

20

it's burnt or--

21

As he gets closer to the car, he smells it more

22

strongly.

23

Amstad, who's identified, opens the door.

24

smell is, uh, much stronger, uh, thus_, giving him

25

probable cause.

motion to dismiss because, uh, so many

And I think what I'm--

I'm left

He smells marijuana, whether--

I'd have to check the record, whether it's-or raw, uh, it may be an open question.

He knocks on the passenger's window.

Mr.

The--

the

Uh, and he, uh, see·s Mr. Hughes, who's
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1

in the driver's seat, putting the--

2

he presumes to be marijuana based on his training and

3

experience.

4

also presumed to be marijuana based on his training and

5

experience.

6

bong, uh, finds some presumed marijuana, also fin9s

7

presumed marijuana in the trunk.

8

probably pretty straightforward recitation of the facts

9

that are sufficient for me to access whether or not this

Also, sees fla--

the baggie, which

uh, uh, green flakes,

And then searches the car, uh, gets the

I think that's

10

statute, the way it's written, applies--

11

this case.

12

of appeal because whatever--

13

think, you know, could be--

14

some ways, I think every judge who's addressed this

15

issue is inviting appeal in a way because, uh, this

16

statute is very poorly written.

17

unclear.

18

going to analyze it both ways.

Uhm, and I'm going to

19

just tell you kind of how I--

how I proceeded through

20

this.

21

because- I don't know how I had the time but, I mean, it

22

wasn't all morning but I just started grabbing, uh,

23

things to figure out what these words mean.

24

I'm--

25

about it.

And I'm--

applies to

I'm saying.that also for purposes
whatever I do here, I
may be appealed, because in

Uhm, it's uh--

I don't know if it's ambiguous or not.

And I--

it's
I'm

I, basically, did this this morning, uh,

Uh, because

I was genuinely curious and genuinely confused
Uh, and the--

and the language is that we--
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1

we need to analyze here.

2

exercise in sentence diagraming.

3

for any person to be present at or on premises of any

4

place where he knows illegal controlled substances are

5

being manufactured or cultivated or are being held for

6

distribution, transportation, delivery, administration,

7

use or to be given away.

8
9

And so the--

And it really is kind of an
It shall be unlawful

the heart of the question is

that as, uh, Mr. Ugelstad would argue that it could be

-10

read in its edited form as it shall be unlawful for any

11

person to be present at any place where he knows illegal

12

controlled substances are being used.

13

Ms. Hunter would argue that it should be read

14

as it shall be unlawful for any person to be present at

15

or on premises of any place where he knows illegal

16

controlled substance--

17

substances are being used.

So that is an issue of statutory

18

interpretation in terms of the meaning of the words and

19

grammatical structure of the sentence, in my opinion.

20

And all of these decisions have--

21

And I think the--

22

[PAUSE].

23

Murphy.

24

lawyer, maybe he is.

25

did a pretty good grammatical analysis and I suspect

have addressed that.

I think the, uh,--

this is na--

I wrote his name down here somewhere.
He may not be a lawyer.

Pierce

I don't think he's a

The community ombudsman actually
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1

that--

that Mr. Murphy is kind of a grammarian, maybe,

2

uh, and he parsed it out that way.

3

correctly identified, of any place, as a prepositional

4

phrase.

5

any place modifies premises.

6

That's--

7

grammar and I--

8

Style, fifteenth edition.

9

not a grammarian.

That's what it is.

that is--

And he's the one who

Of, which is a preposition,
It's--

that is, uh,--

it's adjectival.
that is basic

so I grabbed my Chicago Manual of
Because I don't really--

I'm

And I thought, well, what does that

10

mean?

A prepositional phrase consists of a preposition,

11

its object and any words that modify the object can be

12

used as a noun, an adverb or an adjective.

13

an adjectival phrase; i.e., the cathedrals of Paris.

14

So--

15

of the compound.

16

preposition is significant in terms of interpretation.

17

So because--

18

phrase that modifies premises, premises of any place,

19

it's not grammatically correct to read this in the

20

disjunctive as, to be present at any place.

21

it's not--

22

disjunctive.

23

in two thousand ten in the State v. Lamb case, I read it

24

that way and I think I was wrong grammatically.

25

think that was a correct analysis of the--

We call this

and, generally, a phrase follows the last element
So, it's--

because it is--

the placement of the

it is that prepositional

It's not--

the sentence is not set up to be
And when I was considering this way back

I don't

of the
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1

grarnmari--

of the--

2

And I'm not trying to·parse this.

I'm not making this

3

up.

this is basic, uh,

4

grammar.

5

we're reading statutes we get to disregard that.

6

then, there's that.

7

a role to play in the meaning of this statute and the

8

interpretation of this statute.

This is the--

of the structure of the sentence.

this is the--

And I don't think we--

Okay.

when we're--

when
So,

So, that means premises has

Now, we all know that we have to, uh,--

9

to

10

apply the plain, ordinary meaning of--

of-- of words,

11

uh, that are used in statutes, uh, and if they're

12

specifically defined in the--

13

to use those words the way we commonly use those words.

14

So, like these other judges, I went to the dictionary.

15

First, I went--

16

because we are talking about the law.

17

Black's Law Dictionary from law school.

18

edition.

19

it--

20

significantly since that time, except as otherwise

21

defined in this statute.

22

definitions, which don't apply like in logic in terms of

23

a premise, this is defined as lands and tenements, an

24

estate including lands and buildings thereon, the

25

subject matter of a conveyance, the area of land

in the statute, we have

I went to Black's Law Dictionary,
This is my--

my

It's the fifth

I'm sure it's been updated, but I don't think

uh, this definition of premises has changed

[PAUSE]
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1

surrounding a house, and actually, by our legal

2

construction, forming one encl-

3

distinct and definite locality and may mean a room,

4

shop, building or other definite area - maybe a parking

5

lot or a distinct portion of real estate.

6

that is Black's Law Dictionary.

enclosure with it, a

Okay.

So

7

And then I thought, well, I'll look in--

8

is an American Heritage Dictionary, Second College

9

Edition.

this

Such a [UNINTELLIGIBLE WORD] law, I mean, it

10

is--

it's really fascinating.

11

uh, definition, premises are defined as land and the

12

buildings upon it,

13

So, I--

14

commonly used definition or the common definition of the

15

word premises is related to land and structures or--

16

or, uh, land associated with structures.

I--

17

~

Aside from the logic,

building or part of a building.

I would say that, generally speaking, the

Uhm, I looked for other definitions, uhm, in

18

the--

in the Idaho Code.

I did find one in, uh, the

19

definitions.

20

one, defining a premises where people can sell beer,

21

which is kind of an--

22

an analogy there, I guess, with--

23

premises where drugs might be held.

24

alcohol.

25

one subsection H.

This is under twenty-three - one thousand

you know, there's a little bit of
with, uh, places-In this case it's

This is in, uh, twenty-three dash one thousand
The word premises means the building
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1

and contiguous property owned or leased or used under

2

government permit by a licensee as part of the-business

3

establishment, etcetera.

4

about building and contiguous property.

5

case law on interpreting statutes and of--

.6

So, that definitely, uh, talks
We all know the
you know,

first, before we can even go to legislative history or

7

engage in statutory interpretation, we have to--

8

have to apply the--

9

statute.

the plain language of--

we

of the

And there's actually a statute on this, which

10

I actually didn't know about.

Uh, it's--

it's in, uh,

11

construction of statutes.

12

dash one one three.

13

given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning.

14

statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent

15

of the legislature shall be given effect without

16

engaging in statutory construction.

17

of a statute are the best guide to determining

18

legislative intent.

19

us.

20

conflicting construction, the reasonableness of the

21

proposed interpretation shall be considered and the

22

statute must be construed as a whole.

23

which would render the statute a nullity or which would

24

lead to absurd results are disfavored, as Mr. Ugelstad

25

argued.

It's a statute, seventy-three

The language of a statute should be
Where a

The literal words

That's what the legislation tells

If a statute is capable of more than one

Interpretations

Words and phrases are construed according to
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1

the context and improved use of the language.

2

technical words and phrases and such others as have

3

acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law are

4

defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed

5

according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or

6

definition.

7

one one four, there are particular words that are

8

defined, none of which include premises or motor

9

vehicle.

That's an--

in--

But

then in seventy-three

Although we know that motor vehicle is defined

10

elsewhere in the statute for particular purposes.

11

one of the things I found interesting, as I alluded to

12

before, is thirty-seven - twenty-seven thirty-two--

13

thirty-two, I'm sorry.

14

thirty-seven A, which was enacted after-~

well after

15

thirty-seven - twenty-seven thirty-two D.

So this was

16

enacted in nineteen eighty--

nineteen ninty-one, then

17

revised in two thousand six.

Thirty-seven - twenty-

18

seven thirty-seven A, uh,--

19

statute regarding manufacture or delivery of controlled

20

substance where children are present, specifically

21

defines premises, but only as used in this section--

22

used in this section, motor vehicle or vessel is part of

23

the--

24

Also, dwelling or rental unit, including but not limited

25

to, apartment, townhouse, condominium, mobile home,

is--

And

not

Thirty-seven - twenty-seven

and this is, uh, the

as

is included in the definition of premises.
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1

manufactured home, motel room or hotel room.

2

dwelling house, its curtilage, and any other

3

outbuildings.

4

And C,

So, that's kind of where I wandered through

5

these--

through these statutes, through these

6

definitions.

7

down on this.

8

disjunctive because it's a--

9

phrase of any place modifying premises.

So, this is where--

this is where I come

I think that it cannot be read in the
an adjectival preposition
Under the

10

circumstances of this case, I am not finding that a

11

parking lot, even though it might be associated with a

12

dorm which houses many, many people, can be considered a

13

premises.

14

this, and I have to apply this statute as written.

15

think it--

16

be fairly used in this particular factual situation.

17

There's certainly others where it could be used, when

18

associated with more of what could be fairly defined as

19

a premises.

20

of Judge Kershaw, by Judge Clark and by the ombudsman.

21

I'm not fully, but, uh,--

22

issue of, uh, word meaning and sentence structure.

23

in terms of the potential of sur--

24

an, uh, nullity, I don't think that this interpretation

25

does render the statute a nullity.

I don't think that any place applies, uhm, to

I--

I

I think this is beyond, uh, what could

Uh, I think I am persuaded by the reasoning

but mostly on this--
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you know, rendering

I think it could

1

still apply in many, many circumstances, just not this

2

circumstance.

3

absurdity of having, you know, a parking lot filled with

4

college students smoking marijuana, I think there are

5

two ways to go about dealing with that.

6

parking lot more carefully, uh, or go to the legislature

7

and fix this statute, which I, again, am surprised that

8

nobody has thought to do to clarify it because it could

9

be easily clarified, or appeal my decision and see what

And in response to the potential

Uh, monitor the

10

the Supreme Court says about it.

11

something that I heard Justice Scalia say once at the

12

Bellwood Lecture many years ago, here at the University

13

of Idaho Crillege of Law.

14

don't like how things are or you disagree with it, pass

15

a law.

16

about and so I'm going to grant, uh, Mr. Amstad's Motion

17

to Dismiss and, uh, we'll see what happens.

18

I expect, will likely appeal this decision and maybe we

19

can get some clarification from a higher court, maybe

20

starting with Judge Stegner, maybe the--

21

Supreme Court or maybe the legislature will intervene in

22

the next legislative session.

23

Uhm, I'm reminded of

He said, you know, if you

So, I think that's really what we're talking

The State,

maybe the

I think, honestly, part of the problem is the

24

subsequent passage of, uh, thirty-seven--

25

Thirty-seven - twenty--

what is it?

thirty-seven - twenty-seven
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1

thirty seven A, which then specifically dealt with motor

2

vehicles in this--

3

chapter, and that was very persuasive to me.

in this same context, in this same

4

So, there you have it.

5

MR. UGELSTAD:

6

MS. HUNTER:

7

THE COURT:

8

Any questions?

No, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Alright.

Thank you all.

Good

luck.

9

[WHEREUPON THE HEARING WAS RECESSED AT 4:28

10

P.M., RECONVENING AT 4:28 P.M., COURT, COUNSEL AND THE

11

DEFENDANT BEING PERSONALLY PRESENT AS BEFORE.]

12

THE COURT:

Uh, so, this is just based upon,

13

uh, the, uh, findings and reasoning set forth in--

14

the record.

Uh, the order[sic] to dismiss is granted.

15

MR. UGELSTAD:

16

MS. HUNTER:

17

Thank you, Judge.
Oh, okay.

I don't have to go

through all the grammatical stuff?
'

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. HUNTER:

20

THE COURT:

21

on

No.
Okay.
No.

Because they can--

they're

going to have to do a transcript anyway.

22

MS. HUNTER:

Okay, great.

Okay.

23
24
25

[WHEREUPON THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED AT 4:29
P.M.]

26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

vs.
DANIEL C. AMSTAD,

CASE NO. CR-2017-230

)
)
)

NOTICE OF LODGING OF
TRANSCRIPT

)
)
)

___________ )
Defendant/Respondent.

NOTICE is hereby given that on June 8 2017, the transcript in the above entitled
appeal was lodged with the District Court Clerk. Copies are available for pickup in the
Oerk' s Office of the Latah County Courthouse.

THE PARTIES ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that they have twenty-one days from
the date of this notice in which to file any objections to the transcript; upon failure of the
parties to file any objection within such time period, the transcript shall be deemed
settled.
DATED this 8th day of June 2017.
Henrianne K Westberg
Oerk of the District Cow:t--;;:::;;:::,,,.-,,:.::::--?~-..-;;:;;---
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete
and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF
LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT was hand delivered to:

KEITH SCHOLL
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR
ANDREA HUNTER
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
on this 8th day of June 2017.

NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPT - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, INAND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Case No. CR-2017-230

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)

)
)
)

vs.
DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
Defendant/Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT

.

_______________

On May 10, 2017, the State filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court. The
appeal is taken from the Order Dismissing Case issued by Magistrate Judge John C.
Judge. The transcript of the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was lodged
· with this Court on June 8, 2017. Neither party has filed an objection to the transcript
and therefore, the transcript is therefore now settled in this case. Consequently, a
briefing schedule is appropriate.
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT
Page 1
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-

-

It is ORDERED that:

.(1) Appellant's opening brief shall be filed and served no later than August 7,
2017;
(2) Respondent's response brief shall be filed and served no later than
September 5, 2017;
(3) Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served no later than
September 26, 2017;
(4) Oral argument will be conducted on October 30, 2017, at 9:30 a.m.

G~

.

Dated this·_ day of July.2017.

[r--<"-.~
John R. Stegner
District Judge

. -

·
·

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENT
Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-

I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing
· ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING ORAL
ARGUMENT were delivered in the following methods to:
Keith Scholl
Deputy Prosecutor, Latah County

[

] U.S. Mail
] Overnight Mail

] Fax·
] Hand Delivery

] U.S. Mail
] Overnight Mail

Andrea Hunter
Public Defender, Latah County

] Fax
] Hand Delivery

/-q/

on t h i s ~ day of July. 2017.

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING
ORAL ARGUMENTPage 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON:P,
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.. -,.•JJJ.DJCIALDISTRICT
. . ·,·,·.)p·,
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORT~ ~Q_lJNT:YOFLATAH
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.
DANIEL AMSTAD,
Defendant - Respondent.

LATAH COUNTY CASE
.NO. CR-2017-0230

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF LATAH

HONORABLE JOHN C. JUDGE
Magistrate Judge
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON
Prosecuting Attorney
KEITH SCHOLL
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

ANDREA HUNTER
Attorney at Law
PO Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 8384.3
(208) 882-6749
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P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 883-2246
ATTORNEYS FOR
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual Background

On January 30, 2017, at about 10:40 p.m., Officer Joe Sieverding (Sieverding) noticed
a Honda Accord with fogged windows parked in the west Wallace Complex parking lot on the
University ofldaho Campus in Moscow, Idaho. Dismissal Hearing ("DH") at 9: 23-25, 10: 1-6.
Sieverding approached the car on foot, and from about five feet away from the Honda, he
smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. DH at 10:19-25, 11: 1-2. The
vehicle was not running and he walked up and knocked on the passenger window. DH: 7-8.
Daniel Amstad (Amstad/Defendant) opened the passenger door. DH at 12: 2. Sieverding could
see the driver, C.H., a juvenile, hide a plastic baggie under his seat. DH at 11: 11-12. C.H. also
had what appeared to be marijuana flakes on his lap. DH at 11: 12-15. Sieverding asked C.H.
where the marijuana was and C.H. handed him a small sandwich bag from under the seat
containing marijuana. DH at 12: 19-20. Sieverding then asked what they used to smoke the
marijuana with and C.H. handed him a large glass bong from the back seat. DH at 12:23-25.
Sieverding then asked the occupants to step outside of the vehicle while he conducted a
search. DH at 13: 3-5. During the search, Sieverding found a one gallon sized Ziploc bag with
approximately 46.5g of marijuana and a large quantity of new, plastic Ziploc bags in the trunk,
along with various paraphernalia. DH at 13: 7-14. Before the search ended, CH. also pulled a
digital scale from his pocket and handed it to a covering officer. DH at 13:15-17. After the
investigation was complete, Sieverding cited Amstad with a violation of LC. § 37-2732(d),
which is commonly referred to as Frequenting. DH at 15:18.
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Procedural Background

Toe Defendant was charged with Frequenting, Idaho Code§ 37-27329(d). He pled
"Not Guilty" and moved to dismiss the case. On April 27, 2017 the magistrate court heard
evidence and oral arguments on the matter. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate
stated his factual findings and conclusions of law on the record, and dismissed the case.
On April 28, 2017, the magistrate filed a written Order Dismissing Case. Toe State
timely appealed on May 10, 2017.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The State raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the magistrate err in determining that the west Wallace Complex parking lot
belonging to the University ofidaho is not "the premises of any place" under I.C; §
37-2732(d)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW-

The District Court hears appeals from the magistrate division in the same manner and
on the same standards as an appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court. I.C.R.
54(f)(l). While a Motion to Dismiss under I.C.R 48(a) is typically reviewed for abuse of
discretion, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed by an appellate court as
de novo. State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (2012); State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho
863, 865 (2011).

ARGUMENT

The magistrate erred in determining that a parking lot is not the premises of any place
because the plain meaning of "premises" is a tract of land. The parking lot at issue in this case
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is a tract of land belonging to the University ofldaho. Under Idaho Code 37-2737(d) it is
unlawful for any person:
" ... to be present at or on the premises of any place where he
knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation,
delivery, administration, use, or to be given away."

(Emphasis Added). While there are several elements that the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt in order for a person to be guilty under this statute, the only element the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss challenged was the element emphasized above. Thus, at issue

in this case is the meaning of "premises" and the rules of statutory interpretation as applied to
LC. § 37-2732(d).
In order to determine this issue, the Idaho Supreme Court employs the following
principles of statutory interpretation:
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive
the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act.
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the
statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must
be interpreted in the context of the entire document. The
statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and
provisions of the statute so that none will be void,
superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative
body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider
rules of statutory construction."

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147
Idaho 307, 310 (2009) (internal citations omitted). The State's position in this case is that the
statute is unambiguous and must be construed as a whole, giving all the words in the statute
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Page:5

000159

plain, usual, and ordinary meaning in accordance with Schulz.
First, the statute uses the phrase "present at or on" indicating that there is a difference
from being "at" the premises of any place or "on" the premises of any place. The State's
position is that one can be "at" a premises without being "on" a preJ:?ises. In our case, the
Defendant was not physically standing "on" the parking lot, but was "at" the parking lot by
sitting in the Honda Accord; the vehicle was "on" the parking lot. A reading of the statute that
would allow for a safe haven of sitting in one's vehicle on a tract ofland, and thus, not falling
within the purview of LC. § 37-2732(d), renders the word "at" a nullity or superfluous.
Because none of the statute is to be construed as a nullity or superfluous under Schulz, one
can be "at" a premises without being "on" the premises.
Second, the State does not disagree with the definitions given on the record by the
magistrate, but with the application of the facts to those definitions. A premises is "a tratt of
land with the buildings thereon." "premises." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017.
http://www.merriam-webster.com (5 Aug. 2017). Here, the University ofldaho dormitory
parking lot is a tract of land without buildings or structures. University of Idaho is presumably
responsible for-its upkeep and any premises liability. The parking lot is a premises by its plain
·meaning in accordance with the principles listed in Schulz. Simply because there are no
buildings on this particular area of University of Idaho's land does not mean that the parking
lot is not a premises within the meaning of the LC. §·37-2732(d).
Additionally, the following hypothetical will help to illustrate the error in the
magistrate's holding in this case: A farmer owns Blackacre and uses the parcel to grow
marijuana. There are no structures, outbuildings, or fences on Blackacre. If a person were
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sitting in an automobile directly across the street from Blackacre watching the farmer tend the
marijuana crop, that person would not be in violation ofl.C. § § 37-2732(d). However, if that
same individual were to drive across the street onto Blackacre and discuss marijuana prices
with the farmer from the front seat of his car, that person would now be present at or on the
premises of any place where he knows marijuana is cultivated. Again, there are no buildings,
but the marijuana farm in this hypothetical is still a premises within the meaning of the
statute. Additionally, the hypothetical person was in a vehicle at the time of the violation, yet
was "present at or on" Blackacre.
Third, a holistic reading ofl.C. § 37-2732(d) shows that the statute is very broad in
encompassing all places. The operative words of the statute, "any place," indicate the
legislature's intent to criminalize the conduct of a person who is present anywhere he knows
controlled substances are being used, cultivated, distributed, transported, or given away. The
Defendant in our case was present where marijuana was potentially being used, distributed,
transported, or given away. Because the record is void of the Defendant's knowledge or
intent, the sole issue of the Defendant's presence at a premises should have be ruled as
undisputable and the Motion to Dismiss based solely on the Defendant's presence at the
parking lot should have been denied by the magistrate.
The magistrate erred in holding that the University of Idaho's parking lot serving the
west Wallace Complex dormitory is not a premises of any place under LC. § 37-2732(d). The
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings of the statute indicate a person can be "at" a premises
without being "on" it, that premises includes a parking lot, and the statute is broad enough to
condemn the course of conduct described in the statute at any place.
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CONCLUSION
Because Defendant only challenged the singular element of "present at or on the
premises of any place", and the course of conduct describe on the record falls within I. C. §
37-2732(d), the magistrate abused his discretiond in dismissing this case under I.C.R 48(a)(2).
The State requests that the Order Dismissing Case be reversed and this case be remanded for
further proceedings.
Dated this

1

day of August, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was
delivered to following person and in the manner indicated:

ANDREA HUNTER

Courthouse Mail

Attorney at Law
PO Box 9408
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-6749

Dated this

1.¥h

day of Aug11st, 2017.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

-

Respondent agrees with the Factual Background and Procedural Background set forth in
the Appellant's Statement of the Case in Appellant's Brief, filed herein August 7, 2017.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review is de novo. State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 778, (2012);
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011).

ARGUMENT

The magistrate did not en- in detem1ining that the parking lot in this case was not the
premises of any place under Idaho Code 37-2732(d). Appellant argues that since the parking lot
belonged to the University ofldaho, it is the premises of a place, the university. Idaho Code
37-2732(d), which reads that it is unlawful for a person "to be present at or on the premises of
any place where he lmows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or .
are being held for distribution, transportation, deEvery, administration, or to be given away."
Should the University of Idaho be considered "a place" and every parking lot and tract of land
maintained by the university a "premises" of that place, then only the naive would be truly safe
from a charge under this statute, as there is certainly marijuana being used or held somewhere on
the campus. This is an overbroad interpretation of "the premises of any place," and would render
the statute overbroad and absurd.

While the Respondent agrees that the Court must follow the principles of statutory
interpretation under State v. Schulz, and "must give effect to all words and provisions of the
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statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant," 151 Idaho 866-67 (2011 ), the
Respondent does not agree that '"at" would be rendered a nullity under the magistrate's
interpretation of the statute. The Respondent does not agree that you can be "at" the premises of
any place and not be "on" the premises of any place. The phrase "present at or on" included both
"at" or "on" to be able to describe places and objects. For example, a person is generally
described to be "at" the mall, but "on" the mall's property. If the legislature wanted to·
specifically include cars as a place for a person to be subject to this code section, they might
have used the word "in," or even '·automobile."

The Appellant argues that the statute was written to be very broad. While the statute may
be broad, it is not broad enough to include automobiles. In another similar statute, Idaho Code
37-2737 A, which prohibits manufacturing or delivering controlled substances upon the same
premises as a minor, the statute defines "premises" for the purpose of that section as including a
motor vehicle or vessel. If the legislature wanted to include motor vehicles in the definition of
Idaho Code 37-2732(d), they would have. They were careful enough to broaden the definition of
"premises" to protect children from being exposed to drug trafficking, and if they were
concerned enough with charging college students for being in the same car as their friends who
possessed marijuana, they would have been careful enough to broaden the definition for
"premises" under the so-called frequenting statute as well.

CONCLUSION

The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in dismissing this case under I.C.R. 48(a)(2).
Therefore, the Order Dismissing Case should be affi1111ed.
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Dated this _5th_ day of September, 2017.

An~,__·_-----Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that

011

this _5th_ day of September, 2017, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered 011 the following, in the method indicated:
Keith Scho 11
Deputy Prosecutor
Latah County Prosecutor's Office

[ X]

[ ]
[ ]

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile

P.O. Box 9303
Moscow, ID 83843
By:

~ · ·

neili~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

- COUR',[' MINUTES Sheryl L. Engler
Court Reporter
Recording: Z: 3/2017-10-30
Time: 9:33 A.M.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
Date: October 30, 2017
- STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)
)

Case No. CR-2017-230
Appearances:

)

vs.

)
)

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,

)
)

Defendant/Respondent.
Subject of Proceedings:

Keith Scholl, Deputy Prosecutor
Appearing on behalf of the State

)

Defendant present with counsel,
Andrea Hunter, Public Defender

APPELLATE ARGUMENT

This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for the hearing of
appellate argument in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the
defendant.
Mr. Scholl presented appellate argument on behalf of the State/Appellant. Ms.
Hunter presented appellate argument on behalf of the defendant/respondent. Mr.
Scholl argued in rebuttal. Ms. Hunter argued in surrebuttal.

For reasons articulated on the record, Court affirmed the magistrate's ruling in
this case.
Court recessed at 10:05 A.M.
APPROVED BY:

1;;:R.~
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES - 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

)

STATE OF.IDAHO,

)

Case No. CR-2017-230

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
Defendant/Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
ONAPPEAL

)
)
)

________________) .
In this case, the Magistrate Judge, John C. Judge, dismissed the criminal
charge of "frequenting" 1 brought against the Defendant Daniel C. Amstad. The
State appeals the Magistrate's decision. For the reasons set out in this opinion, the
Magistrate's dismissal of the charge will be affirmed.
The charge is colloquially referred to as "frequenting" because that was the language used in the
statute when it was originally enacted in 1972. 1972 Idaho Sess. Law Ch. 133 § 6, p. 27 4. However,
the statute was amended in 1977 and the frequenting language was deleted. 1977 Idaho Sess. Law
Ch. 185 § 1, p. 517. Nevertheless, the frequenting moniker has remained, even though it is now a
misnomer. The current statute, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d), crin:i.inalizes being present "at or on
premises of any place" where controlled substances are being held and the defendant knows of that
fact.
1
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ON APPEAL
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BACKGROUND

On January 20, 2017, an officer with the Moscow Police Department, Joe
Sieverding, noticed a car parked in the parking lot near the Wallace Complex on the
campus of the University of Idaho. The car's windows were fogged over. It is not ·
clear from the record whether the car, a Honda, was running. As the Officer
approached, he smelled the aroma of marijuana. He knocked on the passenger door.
The Defendant, Daniel Amstad, opened the door and there ih the lap of the driver,
C.H., 2 was a baggie containing what the officer believed to be marijuana. Amstad ·
was charged with violating Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d). The allegation being that he
was "present at or on premises of any place where he [knew] illegal controlled
substances [were] ... being held....."
Amstad moved to dismiss the charge, arguing ''[a] vehicle is not a 'premises of
any place."' Mot. to Dismiss at 2. In support of his motion, Amstad's attorney
attached two decisions: Memorandum Opinion Concerning Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and Motion to Suppress Evidence, State v. Traveller, Twin Falls County ·
Case No. CR-2008-215 (M:ay 8, 2008); and Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss, State
v. Reid, Bonneville County Case No. CR-2014-3601 (July 30, 2014); in which, under
similar, although not identical circumstances, magistrate judges in two different
counties (Twin Falls and Bonneville) concluded that a vehicle was not the premises
of any place and dismissed the charges. (Amstad also attached the analysis of Pierce

C.H. are the initials of the driver who was a minor at the time of the incident The initials C.H. are being
used.to protect the minor's identity.
2
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Murphy, the Community Ombudsman of Boise City in which the Ombudsman came
to .the same conclusion, that a car did not fall within the ambit of the statute.
However, as noted at oral argument, the Ombudsman's analysis has no legal effect
on this Court's analysis.)
On appeal, the State characterizes the issue as follows: "Did the magistrate
err in determining that the west Wallace Complex parking lot belonging to the
University of Idaho is not 'the premises of any place' under LC.§ 37-2732(d)?"
Appellant's Brief at 4. While Judge Judge spoke in terms of the applicability of the
statute to the parking lot (see Tr. of Hearing of Mot_. to Dismiss (Tr.) p. 67, lines 1013 ("I am not finding that a parking lot, even though it might be associated with a
dorm which houses many, many.people, can be considered a premises.'')) those were
not the facts presented to Judge Judge, and therefore did not constitute the holding
of the case.
The transcript makes it clear that Amstad was apprehended while sitting in
tne passenger seat of a car while C.H., the person vyho had physical possession of
the marijuana, sat in the driver's seat. Tr. p. 11. The issue presented to Judge
Judge by Amstad was as follows:
A vehicle is not a "premises of any place."_ When in a vehicle, one
is not "present at or on premises of any place." Therefore, criminal
liability does not attach under that statute when one is a passenger in
a vehicle in which drugs are present.
Mot. to Dismiss at 2. In its response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the State
succinctly articulated the issue facing Judge Judge: "The question presented to this
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Court is whether a person can be 'present at or on the premises of any place' if they
· [sic] are in a vehicle." Response to Defendant's Mot. to Dismiss at 3.
To now attempt to change the issue as being a question about a parking lot
when the facts are undisputed and the existing law analyzed dealt with a person's
presence in a car is to engage in sophistry. This Court will consider the question
presented as it was by the State's attorney when this matter was presented to
Judge Judge - "The question presented to this Court is whether a person can be
'present a tor on the premises of any place' if they [sic] are in a vehicle."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for this Court, in its appellate capacity, in
interpreting a statute is well,settled:
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction
of statutes. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging
in statutory construction. The language of the statute is to be given its
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative
history or rules of statutory interpretation. When this Court must
engage in statutory construction because an ambiguity exists, it has
. the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that
intent. To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is incumbent
upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation that will
not render it a nullity. Constructions of an ambiguous statute that
would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. Addition.ally, if a
criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the
statute must be construed in favor of the accused. However, where a
review of the legislative history makes the meaning of the statute
clear, the rule of lenity will not be applied.
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State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 439-40, 313 P.3d 765, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citations omitted). "Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the
statute, and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.
The objective of statutory interpretation-is to give effect to legislative intent. Such
intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue." State v. McKean,
159 Idaho 75, 79, 356 P.3d 368, 372 (2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS

The operative question presented in this case is what did the legislature
intend when it used the phrase "at or on premises of any place ..."? The State seeks
to prosecute Amstad contending that his presence in a car with another occupant
who had marijuana in his possession constitutes what the legislature sought to
proscribe.
As a threshold matter, it is clear that the definition of premises does not
include a car. Black's Law Dictionary defines premises as follows: "[a] house or
building, along with its grounds; esp., the buildings and land that a shop,
restaurant, company, etc. uses." PREMISES, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014).
Idaho's case law also distinguishes "premises" from a vehicle. See, for
example, State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 982 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1999) in which the
Court of Appeals concluded that a search warrant authorizing a search of a truck
and

a bus did not include the search of "premises." Schaffer,

133 Idaho at 133, 982

P.2d at 968. As noted by the Court of Appeals, "[i]n the instant case, by contrast, the
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search warrant authorized the search of only a truck and a bus located in the
backyard of a house. There was no authorization to search any 'premises.'" Id.
It could also be argued that "premises" modified by the phrase "of any place"
could arguably include a car. However, in order to reach such a conclusion after
having found premises does not include a· car would require interpreting "place" as
including a vehicle. After reviewing the definition of "place" such an argument fails.
"Place" is defined as follows:
This word is a very indefinite term. It is applied to any locality, limited
by boundaries, however large or however small. It may be used to
designate a country, state, county, town, or a very small portion of a
town. The extent of the locality designated by it must generally be
determined by the connection in which it is used. In its primary ancl
most general sense means locality, situation; or site, and it is also used
to designate an occupied situation or building.
· PLACE, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). 3 Suffice to say, the defi_nition of
"place" does not include a parked Honda.
Having concluded that neither "premises" nor "place" refer to a parked car, it
appears the legislature did not intend to criminalize Amstad's activity on January
13, 2017; in its use of the language employed.
Even though the definitions of premises and place do appear to not include a
car, the State argues the legislature should be given latitude when it comes to the
use of its chosen language. Several considerations suggest otherwise. In reading the
statute, it seems ambiguous on its face. It is difficult to glean what the legislature
Apparently, the term "place" has been removed from Black's Law Dictionary by the Seventh Edition
(1999), and remains absent from the Tenth Addition (2014). See Black's Law Dictionary at 1169 (7th ed.
1999).

3
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intended by simply reading the statute. In an effort to understand the legislative
intent, it is helpful to examine the statute in context. In doing so, it becomes
apparent that the legislature has specifically defined "premises" elsewhere in the
Idaho Code as including a "motor vehicle." I refer to Idaho Code § 37-2737A in
which the legislature defined "premises" to mean "[m]otor vehicle or vessel ...."
LC.§ 37-2737A(2). In the statute here being interpreted, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d),
the legislature could have, but chose not to use that definition. The conclusion to
draw from this difference is that the legislature did not intend to include a "motor
vehicle" within its definition of premises or to proscribe this behavior in the statute
in question. The legislature could have expanded the definition of premises to bring
it into congruence with the more expansive definition of Idaho Code§ 37-2737A. It
did not and has not. Consequently, in comparing Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d) with
Idaho Code§ 37-2737A, it appears the legislature did not intend to criminalize
Amstad's behavior.
The second consideration militating in favor of the Defendant is the principle
oflenity.
[I]f a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the
statute must be construed in favor of the accused. However, where a
review of the legislative history and underlying public policy makes the
meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not apply. If the
ambiguity remains after examining the text, context, history, and
policy of the statute, the interpretive tie between the two or more
reasonable readings is resolved in favor of the defendant.
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 969, 318 P.3d 955, 959 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations
omitted). As explained, the plain text chosen by the legislature does not appear to
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include a car within its coverage. Nevertheless, the State urges that "premises" be
given an unconventional and expansive definition. As no~ed, the legislature
recognized in a differenfcode section that when it wanted "premises" to include a
"[m]otor.vehicle" it defined premises as including a motor vehicle. Because the
legislature chose not to do so, it should be assumed that this expansive definition
was not intended by the legislature. Given the ambiguity mentioned, applying the
rule oflenity is appropriate in this case. Consequently, the statute should be
construed in favor of the accused. In matters of statutory construction, the tie does
· not go to the legislature. I~ goes to the defendant. Affording Amstad the r1:1-le of
lenity also leads to the conclusion that an expansive definition of premises would be
inappropriate.
Finally, the fact that every court that has been asked to look at this statute
has come to a similar interpretation lends support to the conclusion that the statute
does not stand for the proposition urged by the State.
CONCLUSION

The decision of the Magistrate Judge in dismissing the. charge against Daniel
Anis tad is AFFIRMED.

.

5r

.

Dated this _\_ day of December 2017.

· District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR LATAH COUNTY
) District Court Case No, CR-2017-230

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

) Supreme Court No.
)

) NOTICE OF APPEAL
)

V.

DANIEL C. AMSTAD,

)
)
)
)

____________
Defendant-Respondent.

TO: DANIEL C. AMSTAD, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, ANDREAS.
HUNTER, P. 0. BOX 9408, MOSCOW, ID 83843 AND·. THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-

ENTITLED COURT:.

.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the above-named

respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the MEMORANDUM OPINION ON APPEM,,
entered in the above-entitled· action on tb.e-1 st day of December, 2017, the Honorable John R
Stegner presiding. A copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice.
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.2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme· Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appeal.able orders under and pursuant to
Rule l l(c)(lO), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Did the district court err by

affirming the magistrate's dismissal of the char$e of frequenting?
4.

To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been sealed.

5.

The appellant requests the preparation of the foUowing portions of the reporter's

transcript:

No additional transcripts are requested. The stafe requests that all transcripts prepared foe
the appeal to the district court from the magistrate division be included in the record.

6.

Appellant requests the nonnal clerk's record pursuantto Rule 28, I.A.R.

7.

I certify:
That a copy ofthis notice of appeal is not being served on a court reporter

(a)

because no additional transcripts are requested; ·
That arrangements have been made with the Latah County Prosecuting

(b)

Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript if one should be
requested in the future;
That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the .

(c)

· preparation of the record beca1:13e the State ofldaho is the appellant (Idaho Code§ 31-3212);
(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal

case (I.AR. 23(a)(8));

(e)

· That service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant·

to RuJe 20, I.A.R.
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DATED this 2nd day of January, 2018.
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
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transcript in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true,
full, complete and correct transcript of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required
under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above entitled cause will be
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the court reporter's transcript and the
clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at

Moscow, Idaho this~ day of
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2018.
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STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
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DANIEL C. AMSTAD,
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I, Tonya Dodge, Deputy Court Oerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that there
were no exhibits presented in this case.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have h ~ n d and affixed the seal of
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this ~ day of
, 2018.

Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the
District Court, Latah County, ID
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this cause as follows:
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MOSCOW, ID 83841

04

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
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